Re: [SystemSafety] Critical systems Linux


Paul Sherwood
 

Now to attempt to answer the question...

On 2018-11-20 18:45, Paul Sherwood wrote:
The question is:-
As Linux is monolithic, already written (with minimal requirements/design
docs) and not to any coding standard
How would the world go about making a Certifiable Linux?
Is it possible?
Some initiatives have already started down this road, for example SIL2LINUXMP (in cc)

But my personal perspective is

1) it may be the the certifications themselves are inappropriate. It's far from clear to me that the current standards are fit for purpose.

2) there are many cases of folks retrofitting documentation to support compliance with standards, so perhaps that would be a feasible thing to attempt (although there is far too much code in the Linux kernel and associated FOSS tooling and userland components to make this something which could be achieved in a short time)

3) if we could establish justifiable concrete improvements to make in Linux (and the tools, and the userland), we could hope to persuade the upstreams to make them, or accept our patches.

4) we could construct new software to meet the ABI commitments of Linux (and other components) while adhering to some specific standards and/or processes, but I'm unconvinced this could be achieved in a time/cost-effective way.

And the question I asked: why do it at all when there are plenty of other
POSIX Compliant RTOS and OS out there that have full Safety Certification to
61508 SIL3 and Do178 etc.?
My understanding is that existing certified RTOS/OS tend to be microkernels with limited functionality, limited hardware support, and performance limitations for some usecases. I'd be happy to be wrong, and no-doubt advocates of some of those technologies can explain the reality by return.

br
Paul

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