Re: RESUME REQUEST: [cip-core] Package Proposal #1 (Security packages)

Kazuhiro Hayashi

Hello Kent,

Thank you for reporting the problem.
I've created an issue on GitLab:

However, I could not reproduce the error.
Could you join the discussion above and tell us the commit ID of `cip-pkglist` you are using and host system information?

Best regards,

Hello reviews,

Thank you for your supporting against our proposal.
I'd like to share you the description sheet for our proposal of security packages.
Please consider my attachment and the following note.

1. Added "fail2ban" as the alternative "pam-shield" because "pam-shield" is not well-maintained and replace with "fail2ban"
2. There are 3 packages in bottom that are under discussion to add. They are out of scope for this review but I'd like
to explain them, so let me know your ideas if you have.
3. The requirements for hardware functions are out of scope for this review, but tpm2 is concrete example mentioned in
the standard, so I'd like to add some packages related tpm2. However, they are options for only using tpm2, so let me
know your comments against adding the packages for a specific use case.


I'd like to create new proposal to add "fail2ban", but the script for generating proposal shows the following error, and
I could not generate it.

Source package name:
Binary packages:

Traceback (most recent call last):
File "./", line 218, in <module>
File "./", line 176, in generate_proposal
deb_src_pkg_info = prepare_src_pkg_info(apt, cve, dep_src_pkg, dep_pkg_info.keys())
File "./", line 51, in prepare_src_pkg_info
dp_list_final = gpd.get_pkg_depends(pkg, apt)
File "/home/yoshidak/cip-pkglist/", line 102, in get_pkg_depends
dp_list, dp_vir_pkg_dict = apt.apt_cache_get_depends_list(pkg_name)
File "/home/yoshidak/cip-pkglist/", line 222, in apt_cache_get_depends_list
File "/usr/lib/python2.7/dist-packages/apt/", line 238, in __getitem__
raise KeyError('The cache has no package named %r' % key)
KeyError: "The cache has no package named 'any>'"

I think that the reason is below. When I enter the information of "fail2ban", the script get the dependency for it as

Enter the source package name: fail2ban
Choose the required binary packages:
1: fail2ban
Input the numbers in comma separated (eg: 1,3,4): 1

Choose one of the virtual package provider: <python3:any>
1: python3
Input the number: 1
Are any of the binary packages used in target rootfs?
1: True
2: False

Would you confirm this issue?

Best regards,

-----Original Message-----
From: Punit Agrawal <>
Sent: Thursday, January 23, 2020 4:35 PM
To: Kento Yoshida <>
Subject: Re: [cip-dev] RESUME REQUEST: [cip-core] Package Proposal #1 (Security

Thank you for your comments, Yoshida-san. Follow up comments inline.

Kento Yoshida <> writes:

Hello and thank you for your comment, Punit,

-----Original Message-----
From: Punit Agrawal <>
Sent: Monday, January 20, 2020 7:29 PM
To: Kento Yoshida <>
Subject: Re: [cip-dev] RESUME REQUEST: [cip-core] Package Proposal #1

Hello Yoshida-san,

Kento Yoshida <> writes:


I would like to resume our proposal from security working group.
As you know, Kazu has modified the script to generate a proposal and
posted the
minimum base system proposal, and then I created the new proposal.

The difference from the original (rev01) proposal is below:
1. We remove 'duplicity', 'google-authenticator', 'pam-shield' and
'suricata' in the
new proposal because they have an issue such as non-well maintained,
python version, too much dependencies and so on. We'll separately
propose them after solved these issues.
2. The new proposal shows all source package as flat. Thanks to the
new script,
3. Actually several packages overlap with the proposed packages for
base system in Debian, so I added comment them like that.,
Would you check this proposal and set the due date to review it?

Please reply if you have any comments or questions.
I have a comment about packages in the proposal that depend on
hardware / system features -

* Some packages in the proposal depend on special purpose hardware to
provide their functionality. e.g., TPM.

In systems, where TPM is not present (or similar functionality is
provided by alternate mechanisms), the TPM related packages will not
be useful. e.g., the non-x86 platforms in the CIP reference hardware

* Similarly, some packages require the system to be connected to the

In both of these situations, I am wondering what is the impact on
compliance? Is there a need to also define minimal set of hardware
features expected from reference hardware to be able to meet compliance
How each reference hardware satisfies the requirements should be
considered by each reference hardware provider.

But without an explicit statement of the requirement, how can a hardware vendor
wanting to develop system for CIP users know what features to enable in their

If we provide hardware mechanisms similar with TPM to protect
credentials and authentications, we can meet compliance requirements.
TPM2 specification is more than 2000 pages long with many features and
functions. I believe the IEC standard requires a subset of this functionality. The
Security WG maybe intimately familiar with the required features but for the
reviewers on this list, there isn't any criteria to use for evaluation.

Stating these functional requirements explicitly will serve the dual purpose of -

* Provide an objective criteria for evaluating the package proposal (and
discuss alternatives)

* Give hardware / system vendors the features / functions needed by CIP

What do you think?

TPM related packages are options in only systems where TPM is
implemented as you said. If supporting these packages require too much
costs, the necessity of them will diminish. Actually the standard
lists TPM as a typical example, so we thought it will be useful to
maintain TPM related packages for many users, but their necessities
depend on supporting cost.
I see - thanks for the background of the TPM-related packages in the proposal.

To help review the package list (and also discuss alternatives), it
would help to define the underlying functionality that is required in
more detail, e.g., secure key storage, verified boot, etc. It'll make
it possible review the proposal more concretely.

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