This affects our kernels (I looked at 5.10.57 and 4.4.277). On one hand we could ask for backport, on the other... I'm not sure it is serious enough to warrant any action.
I think this vulnerability seems to be low priority because an attacker needs another vulnerability to abuse this vulnerability. However, it would be nice to backport the patch too.
So I tried to apply the patch to 4.4, but it rejects, because types changed in the meantime.
In particular eccd5403814b4e762e270ef0464bb86fb217b1bf and 18af77c50fede5b3fc22aa9f0a9b255a5c5285c9 change the printk.
It seems we are actually using the driver in one of the configs:
dev_info(dev, - "Xilinx EmacLite at 0x%08X mapped to 0x%08X, irq=%d\n", - (unsigned int __force)ndev->mem_start, - (unsigned int __force)lp->base_addr, ndev->irq); + "Xilinx EmacLite at 0x%08X mapped to 0x%p, irq=%d\n", + (unsigned int __force)ndev->mem_start, lp->base_addr, ndev->irq); return 0;
error:
Thank you for your work! This patch looks good to me.
Best regards, Pavel -- DENX Software Engineering GmbH, Managing Director: Wolfgang Denk HRB 165235 Munich, Office: Kirchenstr.5, D-82194 Groebenzell, Germany