Re: Sample image including security packages
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-----Original Message----- From: kazuhiro3.hayashi@... [mailto:kazuhiro3.hayashi@...] Sent: 12 March 2020 12:42 To: Venkata Seshagiri Pyla <Venkata.Pyla@...>; Dinesh Kumar <Dinesh.Kumar@...> Cc: cip-security@...; cip-dev@... Subject: RE: Sample image including security packages Hello Venkata, Thank you for checking the result. I confirmed that this variable should not be overwritten in the image recipe. Could you send MR including this update to https://gitlab.com/zuka0828/isar-cip-core ? Best regards, Kazu -----Original Message----- From: Venkata Seshagiri Pyla [mailto:Venkata.Pyla@...] Sent: Thursday, March 12, 2020 12:56 PM To: hayashi kazuhiro(林 和宏 ○SWC□OST) <kazuhiro3.hayashi@...>; dinesh kumar(TSIP DS Company) <dinesh.kumar@...> Cc: cip-security@...; cip-dev@... Subject: RE: Sample image including security packages
Hello Kazu-san,
I observed 'init' system is not included in the image when append operator is not used and so booting the image is not successful.
Here is the output of `bitbake -e cip-core-image-security | grep 'IMAGE_PREINSTALL'` when append is not used ---------------------------------------------------------------------- --------------------------- # $IMAGE_PREINSTALL [2 operations] IMAGE_PREINSTALL=" openssl libssl1.1 fail2ban openssh-server openssh-sftp-server openssh-client syslog-ng-core syslog-ng-mod-journal aide aide-common libnftables0 nftables libpam-pkcs11 chrony tpm2-tools tpm2-abrmd libtss2-esys0 libtss2-udev libpam-cracklib acl libauparse0 audispd-plugins auditd uuid-runtime vim " # "${IMAGE_PREINSTALL} ${IMAGE_INSTALL}" # " ${IMAGE_PREINSTALL} ${IMAGE_INSTALL}" ---------------------------------------------------------------------- ---------------------------
Output when append is used ---------------------------------------------------------------------- --------------------------- # $IMAGE_PREINSTALL [2 operations] IMAGE_PREINSTALL=" init openssl libssl1.1 fail2ban openssh-server openssh-sftp-server openssh-client syslog-ng-core syslog-ng-mod-journal aide aide-common libnftables0 nftables libpam-pkcs11 chrony tpm2-tools tpm2-abrmd libtss2-esys0 libtss2-udev libpam-cracklib acl libauparse0 audispd-plugins auditd uuid-runtime vim " # "${IMAGE_PREINSTALL} ${IMAGE_INSTALL}" # " ${IMAGE_PREINSTALL} ${IMAGE_INSTALL}" ---------------------------------------------------------------------- ---------------------------
Thanks, Venkata. -----Original Message----- From: kazuhiro3.hayashi@... [mailto:kazuhiro3.hayashi@...] Sent: 12 March 2020 05:16 To: Venkata Seshagiri Pyla <Venkata.Pyla@...>; Dinesh Kumar <Dinesh.Kumar@...> Cc: cip-security@...; cip-dev@... Subject: RE: Sample image including security packages
Hello Venkata,
Thank you for the information.
Regarding the usage of `IMAGE_PREINSTALL`, I'm not sure if we always need `+` in the image recipe. Example: https://github.com/ilbers/isar/blob/master/doc/user_manual.md#create-a -custom-image-recipe Could you dump the value of `IMAGE_PREINSTALL` with/without `+` by `bitbake -e` command?
Best regards, Kazu
-----Original Message----- From: Venkata Seshagiri Pyla [mailto:Venkata.Pyla@...] Sent: Thursday, March 5, 2020 6:06 PM To: hayashi kazuhiro(林 和宏 ○SWC□OST) <kazuhiro3.hayashi@...>; dinesh kumar(TSIP DS Company) <dinesh.kumar@...> Cc: cip-security@...; cip-dev@... Subject: RE: Sample image including security packages
Hi Kazu-san and Dinesh,
I have created the image with all proposed security packages included. applied the below change, and booted the image in QEMU correctly. ----------------- diff --git a/recipes-core/images/cip-core-image-security.bb b/recipes-core/images/cip-core-image-security.bb index 70571f8..b883414 100644 --- a/recipes-core/images/cip-core-image-security.bb +++ b/recipes-core/images/cip-core-image-security.bb @@ -18,7 +18,7 @@ IMAGE_INSTALL += "customizations"
# Debian packages that provide security features # TODO: Add sudo or sudo-ldap which conflict each other -IMAGE_PREINSTALL = " \ +IMAGE_PREINSTALL += " \ openssl libssl1.1 \ fail2ban \ openssh-server openssh-sftp-server openssh-client \ -- -----------------
Thanks venkata -----Original Message----- From: Venkata Seshagiri Pyla Sent: 02 March 2020 19:38 To: Dinesh Kumar <Dinesh.Kumar@...>; kazuhiro3.hayashi@... Cc: cip-security@...; cip-dev@... Subject: RE: Sample image including security packages
Hi Kazu-san and Dinesh,
We found most of the packages are not included in the isar image, could you please confirm whether all the proposed packages are included in the given source?
If it is included, could you please let us know how to install them in the image? I think we have to create the image for the target "cip-core-image-security" instead of "cip-core-image".
All the security packages are configured to install are present in this file "cip-core-image-security.bb".
I will generate the image for target "cip-core-image-security" and recheck all the security functionality.
Thanks, Venkata.
-----Original Message----- From: Cip-security [mailto:cip-security-bounces@...] On Behalf Of Dinesh Kumar Sent: 02 March 2020 15:29 To: kazuhiro3.hayashi@... Cc: cip-security@...; cip-dev@... Subject: Re: [Cip-security] Sample image including security packages
Dear Kazu-san,
Thanks for sharing the isar-cip-core repository details with us.
We followed below steps to first confirm whether all the proposed binaries are included when we create CIP isar based image. 1. Create CIP isar based image from "https://gitlab.com/zuka0828/isar-cip-core/-/tree/master" for QEMU_x86-64 platform 2. Booted the image in QEMU virtual machine 3. For each security package we compared the binaries listed on Debian page e.g. for acl package at (https://packages.debian.org/buster/amd64/acl/filelist)
According to the Debian page there are three binaries which should be present in the image "/bin/chacl", "/bin/getfacl", "/bin/setfacl". Then we check in the CIP running image at /bin whether all three packages are included or not. 4. Based on this kind of investigation we have prepare the attached list of missing binary packages in current CIP isar image.
We found most of the packages are not included in the isar image, could you please confirm whether all the proposed packages are included in the given source? If it is included, could you please let us know how to install them in the image?
Once all the security packages are included in the CIP isar image, we will proceed to next step of verifying applicable IEC 62443-4-2 security requirements.
Thanks & Regards, Dinesh Kumar
-----Original Message----- From: Cip-security <cip-security-bounces@...> On Behalf Of kazuhiro3.hayashi@... Sent: 21 February 2020 10:58 To: cip-security@... Cc: cip-dev@... Subject: [Cip-security] Sample image including security packages
Hello CIP Security WG,
I've created a sample setting to customize CIP Core generic profile. https://gitlab.com/zuka0828/isar-cip-core/-/tree/master (Now in my personal account)
Introduction: https://gitlab.com/zuka0828/isar-cip-core/-/blob/master/SECURITY.md
Please ask in cip-dev if you need more development information :)
Note: `sudo` and `sudo-ldap` conflict each other, but both were proposed. We need to select one from them. I temporally removed the both from `IMAGE_PREINSTALL`.
Best regards, Kazu
_______________________________________________ Cip-security mailing list Cip-security@... https://lists.cip-project.org/mailman/listinfo/cip-security The information contained in this e-mail message and in any attachments/annexure/appendices is confidential to the recipient and may contain privileged information. If you are not the intended recipient, please notify the sender and delete the message along with any attachments/annexure/appendices. You should not disclose, copy or otherwise use the information contained in the message or any annexure. Any views expressed in this e-mail are those of the individual sender except where the sender specifically states them to be the views of Toshiba Software India Pvt. Ltd. (TSIP),Bangalore.
Although this transmission and any attachments are believed to be free of any virus or other defect that might affect any computer system into which it is received and opened, it is the responsibility of the recipient to ensure that it is virus free and no responsibility is accepted by Toshiba Embedded Software India Pvt. Ltd, for any loss or damage arising in any way from its use.
The information contained in this e-mail message and in any attachments/annexure/appendices is confidential to the recipient and may contain privileged information. If you are not the intended recipient, please notify the sender and delete the message along with any attachments/annexure/appendices. You should not disclose, copy or otherwise use the information contained in the message or any annexure. Any views expressed in this e-mail are those of the individual sender except where the sender specifically states them to be the views of Toshiba Software India Pvt. Ltd. (TSIP),Bangalore.
Although this transmission and any attachments are believed to be free of any virus or other defect that might affect any computer system into which it is received and opened, it is the responsibility of the recipient to ensure that it is virus free and no responsibility is accepted by Toshiba Embedded Software India Pvt. Ltd, for any loss or damage arising in any way from its use. The information contained in this e-mail message and in any attachments/annexure/appendices is confidential to the recipient and may contain privileged information. If you are not the intended recipient, please notify the sender and delete the message along with any attachments/annexure/appendices. You should not disclose, copy or otherwise use the information contained in the message or any annexure. Any views expressed in this e-mail are those of the individual sender except where the sender specifically states them to be the views of Toshiba Software India Pvt. Ltd. (TSIP),Bangalore.
Although this transmission and any attachments are believed to be free of any virus or other defect that might affect any computer system into which it is received and opened, it is the responsibility of the recipient to ensure that it is virus free and no responsibility is accepted by Toshiba Embedded Software India Pvt. Ltd, for any loss or damage arising in any way from its use. The information contained in this e-mail message and in any attachments/annexure/appendices is confidential to the recipient and may contain privileged information. If you are not the intended recipient, please notify the sender and delete the message along with any attachments/annexure/appendices. You should not disclose, copy or otherwise use the information contained in the message or any annexure. Any views expressed in this e-mail are those of the individual sender except where the sender specifically states them to be the views of Toshiba Software India Pvt. Ltd. (TSIP),Bangalore. Although this transmission and any attachments are believed to be free of any virus or other defect that might affect any computer system into which it is received and opened, it is the responsibility of the recipient to ensure that it is virus free and no responsibility is accepted by Toshiba Embedded Software India Pvt. Ltd, for any loss or damage arising in any way from its use.
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Re: Sample image including security packages
Hello Venkata, Thank you for checking the result. I confirmed that this variable should not be overwritten in the image recipe. Could you send MR including this update to https://gitlab.com/zuka0828/isar-cip-core ? Best regards, Kazu
toggle quoted messageShow quoted text
-----Original Message----- From: Venkata Seshagiri Pyla [mailto:Venkata.Pyla@...] Sent: Thursday, March 12, 2020 12:56 PM To: hayashi kazuhiro(林 和宏 ○SWC□OST) <kazuhiro3.hayashi@...>; dinesh kumar(TSIP DS Company) <dinesh.kumar@...> Cc: cip-security@...; cip-dev@... Subject: RE: Sample image including security packages
Hello Kazu-san,
I observed 'init' system is not included in the image when append operator is not used and so booting the image is not successful.
Here is the output of `bitbake -e cip-core-image-security | grep 'IMAGE_PREINSTALL'` when append is not used ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # $IMAGE_PREINSTALL [2 operations] IMAGE_PREINSTALL=" openssl libssl1.1 fail2ban openssh-server openssh-sftp-server openssh-client syslog-ng-core syslog-ng-mod-journal aide aide-common libnftables0 nftables libpam-pkcs11 chrony tpm2-tools tpm2-abrmd libtss2-esys0 libtss2-udev libpam-cracklib acl libauparse0 audispd-plugins auditd uuid-runtime vim " # "${IMAGE_PREINSTALL} ${IMAGE_INSTALL}" # " ${IMAGE_PREINSTALL} ${IMAGE_INSTALL}" -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Output when append is used ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # $IMAGE_PREINSTALL [2 operations] IMAGE_PREINSTALL=" init openssl libssl1.1 fail2ban openssh-server openssh-sftp-server openssh-client syslog-ng-core syslog-ng-mod-journal aide aide-common libnftables0 nftables libpam-pkcs11 chrony tpm2-tools tpm2-abrmd libtss2-esys0 libtss2-udev libpam-cracklib acl libauparse0 audispd-plugins auditd uuid-runtime vim " # "${IMAGE_PREINSTALL} ${IMAGE_INSTALL}" # " ${IMAGE_PREINSTALL} ${IMAGE_INSTALL}" -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Thanks, Venkata. -----Original Message----- From: kazuhiro3.hayashi@... [mailto:kazuhiro3.hayashi@...] Sent: 12 March 2020 05:16 To: Venkata Seshagiri Pyla <Venkata.Pyla@...>; Dinesh Kumar <Dinesh.Kumar@...> Cc: cip-security@...; cip-dev@... Subject: RE: Sample image including security packages
Hello Venkata,
Thank you for the information.
Regarding the usage of `IMAGE_PREINSTALL`, I'm not sure if we always need `+` in the image recipe. Example: https://github.com/ilbers/isar/blob/master/doc/user_manual.md#create-a-custom-image-recipe Could you dump the value of `IMAGE_PREINSTALL` with/without `+` by `bitbake -e` command?
Best regards, Kazu
-----Original Message----- From: Venkata Seshagiri Pyla [mailto:Venkata.Pyla@...] Sent: Thursday, March 5, 2020 6:06 PM To: hayashi kazuhiro(林 和宏 ○SWC□OST) <kazuhiro3.hayashi@...>; dinesh kumar(TSIP DS Company) <dinesh.kumar@...> Cc: cip-security@...; cip-dev@... Subject: RE: Sample image including security packages
Hi Kazu-san and Dinesh,
I have created the image with all proposed security packages included. applied the below change, and booted the image in QEMU correctly. ----------------- diff --git a/recipes-core/images/cip-core-image-security.bb b/recipes-core/images/cip-core-image-security.bb index 70571f8..b883414 100644 --- a/recipes-core/images/cip-core-image-security.bb +++ b/recipes-core/images/cip-core-image-security.bb @@ -18,7 +18,7 @@ IMAGE_INSTALL += "customizations"
# Debian packages that provide security features # TODO: Add sudo or sudo-ldap which conflict each other -IMAGE_PREINSTALL = " \ +IMAGE_PREINSTALL += " \ openssl libssl1.1 \ fail2ban \ openssh-server openssh-sftp-server openssh-client \ -- -----------------
Thanks venkata -----Original Message----- From: Venkata Seshagiri Pyla Sent: 02 March 2020 19:38 To: Dinesh Kumar <Dinesh.Kumar@...>; kazuhiro3.hayashi@... Cc: cip-security@...; cip-dev@... Subject: RE: Sample image including security packages
Hi Kazu-san and Dinesh,
We found most of the packages are not included in the isar image, could you please confirm whether all the proposed packages are included in the given source?
If it is included, could you please let us know how to install them in the image? I think we have to create the image for the target "cip-core-image-security" instead of "cip-core-image".
All the security packages are configured to install are present in this file "cip-core-image-security.bb".
I will generate the image for target "cip-core-image-security" and recheck all the security functionality.
Thanks, Venkata.
-----Original Message----- From: Cip-security [mailto:cip-security-bounces@...] On Behalf Of Dinesh Kumar Sent: 02 March 2020 15:29 To: kazuhiro3.hayashi@... Cc: cip-security@...; cip-dev@... Subject: Re: [Cip-security] Sample image including security packages
Dear Kazu-san,
Thanks for sharing the isar-cip-core repository details with us.
We followed below steps to first confirm whether all the proposed binaries are included when we create CIP isar based image. 1. Create CIP isar based image from "https://gitlab.com/zuka0828/isar-cip-core/-/tree/master" for QEMU_x86-64 platform 2. Booted the image in QEMU virtual machine 3. For each security package we compared the binaries listed on Debian page e.g. for acl package at (https://packages.debian.org/buster/amd64/acl/filelist)
According to the Debian page there are three binaries which should be present in the image "/bin/chacl", "/bin/getfacl", "/bin/setfacl". Then we check in the CIP running image at /bin whether all three packages are included or not. 4. Based on this kind of investigation we have prepare the attached list of missing binary packages in current CIP isar image.
We found most of the packages are not included in the isar image, could you please confirm whether all the proposed packages are included in the given source? If it is included, could you please let us know how to install them in the image?
Once all the security packages are included in the CIP isar image, we will proceed to next step of verifying applicable IEC 62443-4-2 security requirements.
Thanks & Regards, Dinesh Kumar
-----Original Message----- From: Cip-security <cip-security-bounces@...> On Behalf Of kazuhiro3.hayashi@... Sent: 21 February 2020 10:58 To: cip-security@... Cc: cip-dev@... Subject: [Cip-security] Sample image including security packages
Hello CIP Security WG,
I've created a sample setting to customize CIP Core generic profile. https://gitlab.com/zuka0828/isar-cip-core/-/tree/master (Now in my personal account)
Introduction: https://gitlab.com/zuka0828/isar-cip-core/-/blob/master/SECURITY.md
Please ask in cip-dev if you need more development information :)
Note: `sudo` and `sudo-ldap` conflict each other, but both were proposed. We need to select one from them. I temporally removed the both from `IMAGE_PREINSTALL`.
Best regards, Kazu
_______________________________________________ Cip-security mailing list Cip-security@... https://lists.cip-project.org/mailman/listinfo/cip-security The information contained in this e-mail message and in any attachments/annexure/appendices is confidential to the recipient and may contain privileged information. If you are not the intended recipient, please notify the sender and delete the message along with any attachments/annexure/appendices. You should not disclose, copy or otherwise use the information contained in the message or any annexure. Any views expressed in this e-mail are those of the individual sender except where the sender specifically states them to be the views of Toshiba Software India Pvt. Ltd. (TSIP),Bangalore.
Although this transmission and any attachments are believed to be free of any virus or other defect that might affect any computer system into which it is received and opened, it is the responsibility of the recipient to ensure that it is virus free and no responsibility is accepted by Toshiba Embedded Software India Pvt. Ltd, for any loss or damage arising in any way from its use.
The information contained in this e-mail message and in any attachments/annexure/appendices is confidential to the recipient and may contain privileged information. If you are not the intended recipient, please notify the sender and delete the message along with any attachments/annexure/appendices. You should not disclose, copy or otherwise use the information contained in the message or any annexure. Any views expressed in this e-mail are those of the individual sender except where the sender specifically states them to be the views of Toshiba Software India Pvt. Ltd. (TSIP),Bangalore.
Although this transmission and any attachments are believed to be free of any virus or other defect that might affect any computer system into which it is received and opened, it is the responsibility of the recipient to ensure that it is virus free and no responsibility is accepted by Toshiba Embedded Software India Pvt. Ltd, for any loss or damage arising in any way from its use. The information contained in this e-mail message and in any attachments/annexure/appendices is confidential to the recipient and may contain privileged information. If you are not the intended recipient, please notify the sender and delete the message along with any attachments/annexure/appendices. You should not disclose, copy or otherwise use the information contained in the message or any annexure. Any views expressed in this e-mail are those of the individual sender except where the sender specifically states them to be the views of Toshiba Software India Pvt. Ltd. (TSIP),Bangalore.
Although this transmission and any attachments are believed to be free of any virus or other defect that might affect any computer system into which it is received and opened, it is the responsibility of the recipient to ensure that it is virus free and no responsibility is accepted by Toshiba Embedded Software India Pvt. Ltd, for any loss or damage arising in any way from its use.
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Re: Package Proposal #1 (Security packages), rev03
Thank you for your comments, Punit. I'll reply to your queries, see the followings. * sudo-ldap
Is there a specific requirement to include sudo-ldap in favour of plain sudo? IIUC, sudo is a minimal dependency version while ldap requires additional packages to be available.
We considered and decided to adopt only sudo binary. As the result, sudo source code includes both sudo and sudo-ldap binaries, but we only need sudo. LDAP is just example in the requirement and will be needed only specific case. At least, nobody in security working group members want that. * openssh
Based on the listed requierments, it is not clear why ftp and ssh clients are needed. Can you please clarify the requirements' text to motivate inclusion of the client binaries as well.
SSH client is needed as just a run-time dependency for SSH server. * pam-pkcs11
From my understanding, the package enables login using public / private keys. But the requirements talk about enforcing the strength of passwords -
"A minimum strength of used passwords needs to be enforced."
Possibly a mixup of package and requirements?
Indeed, the package functionality and the requirement do not match. In addition, pam-pkcs11 is only required for CR 1.7, it's mean "A minimum strength of used passwords needs to be enforced.", so we should consider again whether we need pam-pkcs11 or not. Thank you for pointing out this. * tpm2*
I think libtss2-esys0 is mistakenly included as explicit requirement. It seems to be a dependency of tpm2-abrmd and will get pulled in automatically as per my understanding.
Yes. libtss2-esys0 is a dependency tpm2-abrmd and tpm2-tools. But, it is not just a mistake. The TSS and TCTI libraries located in libtss2-esys0 is important to meet the requirement shown in the description for tpm2*. So, I expressly include libtss2-esys0 as a required binary not just a dependency. * uuid-runtime
It’s not clear how the package is related to the requirement -
"Account Identifier shall be unique on a component or system wide level. Protection of relevant information in rest and transit shall be supported."
Can you add more details to the requirement to clarify this?
As is, identifier shall be unique, so we need universally unique identifier generator. Sorry but I don't know what you don't know. This is very simple requirement. -----Original Message----- From: Punit Agrawal <punit1.agrawal@...> Sent: Monday, March 9, 2020 7:31 PM To: Kento Yoshida <kento.yoshida.wz@...> Cc: cip-dev@...; cip-security@... Subject: Re: [cip-dev] Package Proposal #1 (Security packages), rev03
Hi,
As mentioned earlier, I had some questions / queries regarding the requirements for the proposed packages. Sending them here for discussion.
Kento Yoshida <kento.yoshida.wz@...> writes:
Requirements_for_proposal_SecurityWG_rev03.xlsx: the same file which I've already sent before to explain the requirement in the standard * sudo-ldap
Is there a specific requirement to include sudo-ldap in favour of plain sudo? IIUC, sudo is a minimal dependency version while ldap requires additional packages to be available.
* openssh
Based on the listed requierments, it is not clear why ftp and ssh clients are needed. Can you please clarify the requirements' text to motivate inclusion of the client binaries as well.
* pam-pkcs11
From my understanding, the package enables login using public / private keys. But the requirements talk about enforcing the strength of passwords -
"A minimum strength of used passwords needs to be enforced."
Possibly a mixup of package and requirements?
* tpm2*
I think libtss2-esys0 is mistakenly included as explicit requirement. It seems to be a dependency of tpm2-abrmd and will get pulled in automatically as per my understanding.
* uuid-runtime
It’s not clear how the package is related to the requirement -
"Account Identifier shall be unique on a component or system wide level. Protection of relevant information in rest and transit shall be supported."
Can you add more details to the requirement to clarify this? ---
Thanks, Punit
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Re: Sample image including security packages
Hello Kazu-san,
I observed 'init' system is not included in the image when append operator is not used and so booting the image is not successful.
Here is the output of `bitbake -e cip-core-image-security | grep 'IMAGE_PREINSTALL'` when append is not used ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # $IMAGE_PREINSTALL [2 operations] IMAGE_PREINSTALL=" openssl libssl1.1 fail2ban openssh-server openssh-sftp-server openssh-client syslog-ng-core syslog-ng-mod-journal aide aide-common libnftables0 nftables libpam-pkcs11 chrony tpm2-tools tpm2-abrmd libtss2-esys0 libtss2-udev libpam-cracklib acl libauparse0 audispd-plugins auditd uuid-runtime vim " # "${IMAGE_PREINSTALL} ${IMAGE_INSTALL}" # " ${IMAGE_PREINSTALL} ${IMAGE_INSTALL}" -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Output when append is used ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # $IMAGE_PREINSTALL [2 operations] IMAGE_PREINSTALL=" init openssl libssl1.1 fail2ban openssh-server openssh-sftp-server openssh-client syslog-ng-core syslog-ng-mod-journal aide aide-common libnftables0 nftables libpam-pkcs11 chrony tpm2-tools tpm2-abrmd libtss2-esys0 libtss2-udev libpam-cracklib acl libauparse0 audispd-plugins auditd uuid-runtime vim " # "${IMAGE_PREINSTALL} ${IMAGE_INSTALL}" # " ${IMAGE_PREINSTALL} ${IMAGE_INSTALL}" -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Thanks, Venkata.
toggle quoted messageShow quoted text
-----Original Message----- From: kazuhiro3.hayashi@... [mailto:kazuhiro3.hayashi@...] Sent: 12 March 2020 05:16 To: Venkata Seshagiri Pyla <Venkata.Pyla@...>; Dinesh Kumar <Dinesh.Kumar@...> Cc: cip-security@...; cip-dev@... Subject: RE: Sample image including security packages Hello Venkata, Thank you for the information. Regarding the usage of `IMAGE_PREINSTALL`, I'm not sure if we always need `+` in the image recipe. Example: https://github.com/ilbers/isar/blob/master/doc/user_manual.md#create-a-custom-image-recipeCould you dump the value of `IMAGE_PREINSTALL` with/without `+` by `bitbake -e` command? Best regards, Kazu -----Original Message----- From: Venkata Seshagiri Pyla [mailto:Venkata.Pyla@...] Sent: Thursday, March 5, 2020 6:06 PM To: hayashi kazuhiro(林 和宏 ○SWC□OST) <kazuhiro3.hayashi@...>; dinesh kumar(TSIP DS Company) <dinesh.kumar@...> Cc: cip-security@...; cip-dev@... Subject: RE: Sample image including security packages
Hi Kazu-san and Dinesh,
I have created the image with all proposed security packages included. applied the below change, and booted the image in QEMU correctly. ----------------- diff --git a/recipes-core/images/cip-core-image-security.bb b/recipes-core/images/cip-core-image-security.bb index 70571f8..b883414 100644 --- a/recipes-core/images/cip-core-image-security.bb +++ b/recipes-core/images/cip-core-image-security.bb @@ -18,7 +18,7 @@ IMAGE_INSTALL += "customizations"
# Debian packages that provide security features # TODO: Add sudo or sudo-ldap which conflict each other -IMAGE_PREINSTALL = " \ +IMAGE_PREINSTALL += " \ openssl libssl1.1 \ fail2ban \ openssh-server openssh-sftp-server openssh-client \ -- -----------------
Thanks venkata -----Original Message----- From: Venkata Seshagiri Pyla Sent: 02 March 2020 19:38 To: Dinesh Kumar <Dinesh.Kumar@...>; kazuhiro3.hayashi@... Cc: cip-security@...; cip-dev@... Subject: RE: Sample image including security packages
Hi Kazu-san and Dinesh,
We found most of the packages are not included in the isar image, could you please confirm whether all the proposed packages are included in the given source?
If it is included, could you please let us know how to install them in the image? I think we have to create the image for the target "cip-core-image-security" instead of "cip-core-image".
All the security packages are configured to install are present in this file "cip-core-image-security.bb".
I will generate the image for target "cip-core-image-security" and recheck all the security functionality.
Thanks, Venkata.
-----Original Message----- From: Cip-security [mailto:cip-security-bounces@...] On Behalf Of Dinesh Kumar Sent: 02 March 2020 15:29 To: kazuhiro3.hayashi@... Cc: cip-security@...; cip-dev@... Subject: Re: [Cip-security] Sample image including security packages
Dear Kazu-san,
Thanks for sharing the isar-cip-core repository details with us.
We followed below steps to first confirm whether all the proposed binaries are included when we create CIP isar based image. 1. Create CIP isar based image from "https://gitlab.com/zuka0828/isar-cip-core/-/tree/master" for QEMU_x86-64 platform 2. Booted the image in QEMU virtual machine 3. For each security package we compared the binaries listed on Debian page e.g. for acl package at (https://packages.debian.org/buster/amd64/acl/filelist) According to the Debian page there are three binaries which should be present in the image "/bin/chacl", "/bin/getfacl", "/bin/setfacl". Then we check in the CIP running image at /bin whether all three packages are included or not. 4. Based on this kind of investigation we have prepare the attached list of missing binary packages in current CIP isar image.
We found most of the packages are not included in the isar image, could you please confirm whether all the proposed packages are included in the given source? If it is included, could you please let us know how to install them in the image?
Once all the security packages are included in the CIP isar image, we will proceed to next step of verifying applicable IEC 62443-4-2 security requirements.
Thanks & Regards, Dinesh Kumar
-----Original Message----- From: Cip-security <cip-security-bounces@...> On Behalf Of kazuhiro3.hayashi@... Sent: 21 February 2020 10:58 To: cip-security@... Cc: cip-dev@... Subject: [Cip-security] Sample image including security packages
Hello CIP Security WG,
I've created a sample setting to customize CIP Core generic profile. https://gitlab.com/zuka0828/isar-cip-core/-/tree/master (Now in my personal account)
Introduction: https://gitlab.com/zuka0828/isar-cip-core/-/blob/master/SECURITY.md
Please ask in cip-dev if you need more development information :)
Note: `sudo` and `sudo-ldap` conflict each other, but both were proposed. We need to select one from them. I temporally removed the both from `IMAGE_PREINSTALL`.
Best regards, Kazu
_______________________________________________ Cip-security mailing list Cip-security@... https://lists.cip-project.org/mailman/listinfo/cip-security The information contained in this e-mail message and in any attachments/annexure/appendices is confidential to the recipient and may contain privileged information. If you are not the intended recipient, please notify the sender and delete the message along with any attachments/annexure/appendices. You should not disclose, copy or otherwise use the information contained in the message or any annexure. Any views expressed in this e-mail are those of the individual sender except where the sender specifically states them to be the views of Toshiba Software India Pvt. Ltd. (TSIP),Bangalore.
Although this transmission and any attachments are believed to be free of any virus or other defect that might affect any computer system into which it is received and opened, it is the responsibility of the recipient to ensure that it is virus free and no responsibility is accepted by Toshiba Embedded Software India Pvt. Ltd, for any loss or damage arising in any way from its use. The information contained in this e-mail message and in any attachments/annexure/appendices is confidential to the recipient and may contain privileged information. If you are not the intended recipient, please notify the sender and delete the message along with any attachments/annexure/appendices. You should not disclose, copy or otherwise use the information contained in the message or any annexure. Any views expressed in this e-mail are those of the individual sender except where the sender specifically states them to be the views of Toshiba Software India Pvt. Ltd. (TSIP),Bangalore.
Although this transmission and any attachments are believed to be free of any virus or other defect that might affect any computer system into which it is received and opened, it is the responsibility of the recipient to ensure that it is virus free and no responsibility is accepted by Toshiba Embedded Software India Pvt. Ltd, for any loss or damage arising in any way from its use. The information contained in this e-mail message and in any attachments/annexure/appendices is confidential to the recipient and may contain privileged information. If you are not the intended recipient, please notify the sender and delete the message along with any attachments/annexure/appendices. You should not disclose, copy or otherwise use the information contained in the message or any annexure. Any views expressed in this e-mail are those of the individual sender except where the sender specifically states them to be the views of Toshiba Software India Pvt. Ltd. (TSIP),Bangalore. Although this transmission and any attachments are believed to be free of any virus or other defect that might affect any computer system into which it is received and opened, it is the responsibility of the recipient to ensure that it is virus free and no responsibility is accepted by Toshiba Embedded Software India Pvt. Ltd, for any loss or damage arising in any way from its use.
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Re: How to handle diffs created in -rebase branch
# Add cip-dev@... to CC Hi Pavel,
Thanks for your comment.
toggle quoted messageShow quoted text
-----Original Message----- From: Pavel Machek [mailto:pavel@...] Sent: Tuesday, March 3, 2020 9:00 PM To: iwamatsu nobuhiro(岩松 信洋 ○SWC□OST) <nobuhiro1.iwamatsu@...> Subject: Re: How to handle diffs created in -rebase branch
Hi!
(I believe we should cc cip-dev for this discussion). Yes, I added cip-dev to CC.
Commit 9c075d325ec23a9bd99b7097f0b82ec04b007093 [1] has this fix in v4.4.211, but commit edeed5f910db5962f4ecc097ad6d935a33041ee0 [2] deletes the file once and commit 5a0d157b6153b462eabd8afcf827877e885336b9 [3] recreated the file.
If we rebase this, since the order of commits is 2, 3, 1 to 1,
2,
3, the above diffs was created. I believe commit [1] is good, and we should not undo its effects with other commits. Thus linux-4.4.y-cip is okay, and linux-4.4.y-cip-rebase should be fixed. One way would be to cherry-pick 1 into linux-4.4.y-cip-rebase. I see, but commit [1] was already applied to v4.4.211 by upstream. So the same commit is apply twice. Is this understanding same your suggest?
1. commit [1] / in v4.4.211 ..... x. commit / release v4.4.213 ..... x + 1. commit [2] / Delete fix by commit [1] / CIP's commit x + 2. commit [3] / CIP's commit x + 3. cherry-pick commit [1] <--- your suggest
-rebase branch is a branch that manages commits in the LTS tree and CIP tree.
So a fix like this one always makes a difference. I think there are two measures.
1. Ignore differences because it is a branch that manages commits. 2. If a difference occurs, commit to fix it. (Your suggestion)
I think that both are useful, but I want to get consensus with you as kernel maintainers of CIP. It is important for me for both branches to end up with same result.
OK. "If a difference occurs, commit to fix it" is an acceptable solution to it. But thinking about it some more, there may be even better one.
Central problem is that we delete fixed version of file, then re-create the file without the fix. We should simply modify the re-creating patch to create the fixed version.
I understood. If you want, I can try to do just that; but at the moment, current versions do not seem to be on kernel.org:
4.4.213-based: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/cip/linux-cip.git/lo g/?h=linux-4.4.y-cip 4.4.208-based: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/cip/linux-cip.git/lo g/?h=linux-4.4.y-cip-rebase
Yes, we haven't resolved this issue, so I haven't committed to the rebase branch yet. And, I fixes suggested above. Current tree: https://gitlab.com/iwamatsu/linux-cip/-/tree/rebase-check/linux-4.4.y-cip-rebase-baseCause commit: https://gitlab.com/iwamatsu/linux-cip/-/commit/5b451956c2c67656f1c6dcb5caa9fd7b9ab75613 - 5b451956c2c6 firmware: Restore support for built-in firmware Fixed tree: https://gitlab.com/iwamatsu/linux-cip/-/tree/rebase-check/linux-4.4.y-cip-rebase-fix0Fixed commit: https://gitlab.com/iwamatsu/linux-cip/-/commit/d841fec71b9bf4117b9859d7ffba68210160c484 - d841fec71b9b firmware: Restore support for built-in firmware --- $ git diff rebase-check/linux-4.4.y-cip-rebase-base rebase-check/linux-4.4.y-cip-rebase-fix0 diff --git a/firmware/Makefile b/firmware/Makefile index fa0808853883..c944cf092926 100644 --- a/firmware/Makefile +++ b/firmware/Makefile @@ -18,7 +18,7 @@ quiet_cmd_fwbin = MK_FW $@ PROGBITS=$(if $(CONFIG_ARM),%,@)progbits; \ echo "/* Generated by firmware/Makefile */" > $@;\ echo " .section .rodata" >>$@;\ - echo " .p2align $${ASM_ALIGN}" >>$@;\ + echo " .p2align 4" >>$@;\ echo "_fw_$${FWSTR}_bin:" >>$@;\ echo " .incbin \"$(2)\"" >>$@;\ echo "_fw_end:" >>$@;\ --- Could you please check and comment on fixed commit? Best regards, Nobuhiro
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Re: Sample image including security packages
toggle quoted messageShow quoted text
-----Original Message----- From: Venkata Seshagiri Pyla [mailto:Venkata.Pyla@...] Sent: Thursday, March 5, 2020 6:06 PM To: hayashi kazuhiro(林 和宏 ○SWC□OST) <kazuhiro3.hayashi@...>; dinesh kumar(TSIP DS Company) <dinesh.kumar@...> Cc: cip-security@...; cip-dev@... Subject: RE: Sample image including security packages
Hi Kazu-san and Dinesh,
I have created the image with all proposed security packages included. applied the below change, and booted the image in QEMU correctly. ----------------- diff --git a/recipes-core/images/cip-core-image-security.bb b/recipes-core/images/cip-core-image-security.bb index 70571f8..b883414 100644 --- a/recipes-core/images/cip-core-image-security.bb +++ b/recipes-core/images/cip-core-image-security.bb @@ -18,7 +18,7 @@ IMAGE_INSTALL += "customizations"
# Debian packages that provide security features # TODO: Add sudo or sudo-ldap which conflict each other -IMAGE_PREINSTALL = " \ +IMAGE_PREINSTALL += " \ openssl libssl1.1 \ fail2ban \ openssh-server openssh-sftp-server openssh-client \ -- -----------------
Thanks venkata -----Original Message----- From: Venkata Seshagiri Pyla Sent: 02 March 2020 19:38 To: Dinesh Kumar <Dinesh.Kumar@...>; kazuhiro3.hayashi@... Cc: cip-security@...; cip-dev@... Subject: RE: Sample image including security packages
Hi Kazu-san and Dinesh,
We found most of the packages are not included in the isar image, could you please confirm whether all the proposed packages are included in the given source?
If it is included, could you please let us know how to install them in the image? I think we have to create the image for the target "cip-core-image-security" instead of "cip-core-image".
All the security packages are configured to install are present in this file "cip-core-image-security.bb".
I will generate the image for target "cip-core-image-security" and recheck all the security functionality.
Thanks, Venkata.
-----Original Message----- From: Cip-security [mailto:cip-security-bounces@...] On Behalf Of Dinesh Kumar Sent: 02 March 2020 15:29 To: kazuhiro3.hayashi@... Cc: cip-security@...; cip-dev@... Subject: Re: [Cip-security] Sample image including security packages
Dear Kazu-san,
Thanks for sharing the isar-cip-core repository details with us.
We followed below steps to first confirm whether all the proposed binaries are included when we create CIP isar based image. 1. Create CIP isar based image from "https://gitlab.com/zuka0828/isar-cip-core/-/tree/master" for QEMU_x86-64 platform 2. Booted the image in QEMU virtual machine 3. For each security package we compared the binaries listed on Debian page e.g. for acl package at (https://packages.debian.org/buster/amd64/acl/filelist) According to the Debian page there are three binaries which should be present in the image "/bin/chacl", "/bin/getfacl", "/bin/setfacl". Then we check in the CIP running image at /bin whether all three packages are included or not. 4. Based on this kind of investigation we have prepare the attached list of missing binary packages in current CIP isar image.
We found most of the packages are not included in the isar image, could you please confirm whether all the proposed packages are included in the given source? If it is included, could you please let us know how to install them in the image?
Once all the security packages are included in the CIP isar image, we will proceed to next step of verifying applicable IEC 62443-4-2 security requirements.
Thanks & Regards, Dinesh Kumar
-----Original Message----- From: Cip-security <cip-security-bounces@...> On Behalf Of kazuhiro3.hayashi@... Sent: 21 February 2020 10:58 To: cip-security@... Cc: cip-dev@... Subject: [Cip-security] Sample image including security packages
Hello CIP Security WG,
I've created a sample setting to customize CIP Core generic profile. https://gitlab.com/zuka0828/isar-cip-core/-/tree/master (Now in my personal account)
Introduction: https://gitlab.com/zuka0828/isar-cip-core/-/blob/master/SECURITY.md
Please ask in cip-dev if you need more development information :)
Note: `sudo` and `sudo-ldap` conflict each other, but both were proposed. We need to select one from them. I temporally removed the both from `IMAGE_PREINSTALL`.
Best regards, Kazu
_______________________________________________ Cip-security mailing list Cip-security@... https://lists.cip-project.org/mailman/listinfo/cip-security The information contained in this e-mail message and in any attachments/annexure/appendices is confidential to the recipient and may contain privileged information. If you are not the intended recipient, please notify the sender and delete the message along with any attachments/annexure/appendices. You should not disclose, copy or otherwise use the information contained in the message or any annexure. Any views expressed in this e-mail are those of the individual sender except where the sender specifically states them to be the views of Toshiba Software India Pvt. Ltd. (TSIP),Bangalore.
Although this transmission and any attachments are believed to be free of any virus or other defect that might affect any computer system into which it is received and opened, it is the responsibility of the recipient to ensure that it is virus free and no responsibility is accepted by Toshiba Embedded Software India Pvt. Ltd, for any loss or damage arising in any way from its use. The information contained in this e-mail message and in any attachments/annexure/appendices is confidential to the recipient and may contain privileged information. If you are not the intended recipient, please notify the sender and delete the message along with any attachments/annexure/appendices. You should not disclose, copy or otherwise use the information contained in the message or any annexure. Any views expressed in this e-mail are those of the individual sender except where the sender specifically states them to be the views of Toshiba Software India Pvt. Ltd. (TSIP),Bangalore.
Although this transmission and any attachments are believed to be free of any virus or other defect that might affect any computer system into which it is received and opened, it is the responsibility of the recipient to ensure that it is virus free and no responsibility is accepted by Toshiba Embedded Software India Pvt. Ltd, for any loss or damage arising in any way from its use.
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CIP IRC weekly meeting today
Hi all, Kindly be reminded to attend the weekly meeting through IRC to discuss technical topics with CIP kernel today. *Please note that the IRC meeting was rescheduled to UTC (GMT) 09:00 starting from the first week of Apr. according to TSC meeting* https://www.timeanddate.com/worldclock/meetingdetails.html?year=2020&month=3&day=12&hour=9&min=0&sec=0&p1=224&p2=179&p3=136&p4=37&p5=241&p6=248US-West US-East UK DE TW JP 02:00 05:00 09:00 10:00 17:00 18:00 Channel: * irc:chat.freenode.net:6667/cip Last meeting minutes: https://irclogs.baserock.org/meetings/cip/2020/03/cip.2020-03-05-09.00.log.htmlAgenda: * Action item 1. Combine root filesystem with kselftest binary - Iwamatsu-san 2. Assign the owner of "CIP kernel config" - masashi910 3. Refine statistics figures of Kernel Team contributions to upstream (LTS) - masashi910 4. Strengthen sustainable process to backport patches from Mainline/LTS - TBD 4-1. Workflow for identifying important fixes, backporting, and reviewing them 4-2. Prepare the tools to be used for this workflow 4-3. Get practice in backporting patches 5. Upload a guideline for reference hardware platform addition - masashi910 The following action item was defined at the team call on Feb 27th. We will work on this when time comes. x. Explore the possibilities to work on security fixes proactively * Kernel maintenance updates * Kernel testing * CIP Core * Software update * AOB 1. Summer Time US summer time started on March 8. CEST starts on March 29. This IRC meeting starts at UTC (GMT) 09:00. The meeting will take 30 min, although it can be extended to an hour if it makes sense and those involved in the topics can stay. Otherwise, the topic will be taken offline or in the next meeting. Best regards, -- M. Kudo Cybertrust Japan Co., Ltd.
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Re: I need de0-nano testing for -rt release was Re: 4.19.106-cip21-rt8 problems on de0-nano
Bhola, Bikram <Bikram_Bhola@...>
Hi Jan and All,
Both de0-nano and IPC227E targets are up and running. I have monitored for test jobs on it and those completed successfully.
Thank You!!
Regards, Bikram
toggle quoted messageShow quoted text
-----Original Message----- From: Bhola, Bikram Sent: 10 March 2020 22:20 To: 'Jan Kiszka' <jan.kiszka@...>; Pavel Machek <pavel@...>; Quirin Gylstorff <quirin.gylstorff@...> Cc: cip-dev@... Subject: RE: I need de0-nano testing for -rt release was Re: [cip-dev] 4.19.106-cip21-rt8 problems on de0-nano Hi Jan and All,, We are working on it. Looks like we have a slow network in last few days in our lab that results in rootfs download timeout failure. Time being we need to increase the current timeout from 15 mins to 30 mins for safer side (its failing in between 90% completion). Meantime I am working with our network team to diagnose the slowness. Thank You!! Regards, Bikram -----Original Message----- From: Jan Kiszka [mailto:jan.kiszka@...] Sent: 10 March 2020 00:23 To: Pavel Machek <pavel@...>; Bhola, Bikram <Bikram_Bhola@...>; Quirin Gylstorff <quirin.gylstorff@...> Cc: cip-dev@... Subject: Re: I need de0-nano testing for -rt release was Re: [cip-dev] 4.19.106-cip21-rt8 problems on de0-nano On 09.03.20 11:21, Pavel Machek wrote: Hi!
I pushed candidate for -cip-rt, but it seems to fail on de0-nano board. Code under testing is at:
https://gitlab.com/cip-project/cip-kernel/linux-cip/tree/ci/pavel /linux-cip It is pipeline
https://gitlab.com/cip-project/cip-kernel/linux-cip/pipelines/1227 62401
I'll reuse the branch for more testing. I managed to narrow the bad commit to the -rt tree, between:
OK 122904930 pick 69aa73357e6a rcu: Don't allow to change rcu_normal_after_boot on RT pick 849ef8789077 pci/switchtec: fix stream_open.cocci warnings pick ad8a5e8279c4 sched/core: Drop a preempt_disable_rt() statement pick 966f066d96cb timers: Redo the notification of canceling timers on -RT pick 0393fd5a4f9a Revert "futex: Ensure lock/unlock symetry versus pi_lock and hash bucket lock" pick 84eb0b64a27a Revert "futex: Fix bug on when a requeued RT task times out" pick fcc893280f4e Revert "rtmutex: Handle the various new futex race conditions" pick 2eac93cf9d16 Revert "futex: workaround migrate_disable/enable in different context" pick 9b8964629f4f futex: Make the futex_hash_bucket lock raw pick cc1812bf198b futex: Delay deallocation of pi_state
pick f5e115c43100 mm/zswap: Do not disable preemption in zswap_frontswap_store() pick e0d0d09a08ad revert-aio pick a0a40bfb4300 fs/aio: simple simple work pick 0fae581d8c5e revert-thermal pick c0d95b4a8a1b thermal: Defer thermal wakups to threads pick 700fbb4afb6e revert-block pick 4cda50ff12cf block: blk-mq: move blk_queue_usage_counter_release() into process context pick 9e982f55745b workqueue: rework pick c0db53dc3bf4 i2c: exynos5: Remove IRQF_ONESHOT pick 1f160d170203 i2c: hix5hd2: Remove IRQF_ONESHOT BAD 122882826 eae5a7cab722 sched/deadline: Ensure inactive_timer runs in hardirq context
And something went seriously wrong after these tests. I submitted same tree twice, and got different results.
First this -- de0-nano succeeds:
https://gitlab.com/cip-project/cip-kernel/linux-cip/pipelines/122904 930
Now this -- de0-nano fails (and ipc227e is unfinished for long time):
https://gitlab.com/cip-project/cip-kernel/linux-cip/pipelines/122959 477
I'll need some help here. The logs read like the targets are not (always) coming up, e.g. https://gitlab.com/cip-project/cip-kernel/linux-cip/-/jobs/457824214# L377 Yes... I don't need that target, but I need de0-nano... and it did not work last time I checked. Bikram, could someone on your side check the board status in the Mentor lab? Thanks! On a related note... it would be good to somehow show difference between "kernel test failure" and "target failure".
If we see bootloader in the logs, and then test fails/timeouts => "kernel test failure", I need to solve it.
If we don't get messages from the bootloader => "target failure", someone needs to check the power relays or something...
I'm not happy about the parsability of those LAVA logs either, but I have no idea if/how that can be improved best. Maybe Quirin has some idea based on his work with them. Jan -- Siemens AG, Corporate Technology, CT RDA IOT SES-DE Corporate Competence Center Embedded Linux
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Re: I need de0-nano testing for -rt release was Re: 4.19.106-cip21-rt8 problems on de0-nano
Bhola, Bikram <Bikram_Bhola@...>
Hi Jan and All,,
We are working on it.
Looks like we have a slow network in last few days in our lab that results in rootfs download timeout failure. Time being we need to increase the current timeout from 15 mins to 30 mins for safer side (its failing in between 90% completion). Meantime I am working with our network team to diagnose the slowness.
Thank You!!
Regards, Bikram
toggle quoted messageShow quoted text
-----Original Message----- From: Jan Kiszka [mailto:jan.kiszka@...] Sent: 10 March 2020 00:23 To: Pavel Machek <pavel@...>; Bhola, Bikram <Bikram_Bhola@...>; Quirin Gylstorff <quirin.gylstorff@...> Cc: cip-dev@... Subject: Re: I need de0-nano testing for -rt release was Re: [cip-dev] 4.19.106-cip21-rt8 problems on de0-nano On 09.03.20 11:21, Pavel Machek wrote: Hi!
I pushed candidate for -cip-rt, but it seems to fail on de0-nano board. Code under testing is at:
https://gitlab.com/cip-project/cip-kernel/linux-cip/tree/ci/pavel /linux-cip It is pipeline
https://gitlab.com/cip-project/cip-kernel/linux-cip/pipelines/1227 62401
I'll reuse the branch for more testing. I managed to narrow the bad commit to the -rt tree, between:
OK 122904930 pick 69aa73357e6a rcu: Don't allow to change rcu_normal_after_boot on RT pick 849ef8789077 pci/switchtec: fix stream_open.cocci warnings pick ad8a5e8279c4 sched/core: Drop a preempt_disable_rt() statement pick 966f066d96cb timers: Redo the notification of canceling timers on -RT pick 0393fd5a4f9a Revert "futex: Ensure lock/unlock symetry versus pi_lock and hash bucket lock" pick 84eb0b64a27a Revert "futex: Fix bug on when a requeued RT task times out" pick fcc893280f4e Revert "rtmutex: Handle the various new futex race conditions" pick 2eac93cf9d16 Revert "futex: workaround migrate_disable/enable in different context" pick 9b8964629f4f futex: Make the futex_hash_bucket lock raw pick cc1812bf198b futex: Delay deallocation of pi_state
pick f5e115c43100 mm/zswap: Do not disable preemption in zswap_frontswap_store() pick e0d0d09a08ad revert-aio pick a0a40bfb4300 fs/aio: simple simple work pick 0fae581d8c5e revert-thermal pick c0d95b4a8a1b thermal: Defer thermal wakups to threads pick 700fbb4afb6e revert-block pick 4cda50ff12cf block: blk-mq: move blk_queue_usage_counter_release() into process context pick 9e982f55745b workqueue: rework pick c0db53dc3bf4 i2c: exynos5: Remove IRQF_ONESHOT pick 1f160d170203 i2c: hix5hd2: Remove IRQF_ONESHOT BAD 122882826 eae5a7cab722 sched/deadline: Ensure inactive_timer runs in hardirq context
And something went seriously wrong after these tests. I submitted same tree twice, and got different results.
First this -- de0-nano succeeds:
https://gitlab.com/cip-project/cip-kernel/linux-cip/pipelines/122904 930
Now this -- de0-nano fails (and ipc227e is unfinished for long time):
https://gitlab.com/cip-project/cip-kernel/linux-cip/pipelines/122959 477
I'll need some help here. The logs read like the targets are not (always) coming up, e.g. https://gitlab.com/cip-project/cip-kernel/linux-cip/-/jobs/457824214# L377 Yes... I don't need that target, but I need de0-nano... and it did not work last time I checked. Bikram, could someone on your side check the board status in the Mentor lab? Thanks! On a related note... it would be good to somehow show difference between "kernel test failure" and "target failure".
If we see bootloader in the logs, and then test fails/timeouts => "kernel test failure", I need to solve it.
If we don't get messages from the bootloader => "target failure", someone needs to check the power relays or something...
I'm not happy about the parsability of those LAVA logs either, but I have no idea if/how that can be improved best. Maybe Quirin has some idea based on his work with them. Jan -- Siemens AG, Corporate Technology, CT RDA IOT SES-DE Corporate Competence Center Embedded Linux
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Re: I need de0-nano testing for -rt release was Re: 4.19.106-cip21-rt8 problems on de0-nano
On 09.03.20 11:21, Pavel Machek wrote: Hi!
I pushed candidate for -cip-rt, but it seems to fail on de0-nano board. Code under testing is at:
https://gitlab.com/cip-project/cip-kernel/linux-cip/tree/ci/pavel/linux-cip It is pipeline
https://gitlab.com/cip-project/cip-kernel/linux-cip/pipelines/122762401
I'll reuse the branch for more testing. I managed to narrow the bad commit to the -rt tree, between:
OK 122904930 pick 69aa73357e6a rcu: Don't allow to change rcu_normal_after_boot on RT pick 849ef8789077 pci/switchtec: fix stream_open.cocci warnings pick ad8a5e8279c4 sched/core: Drop a preempt_disable_rt() statement pick 966f066d96cb timers: Redo the notification of canceling timers on -RT pick 0393fd5a4f9a Revert "futex: Ensure lock/unlock symetry versus pi_lock and hash bucket lock" pick 84eb0b64a27a Revert "futex: Fix bug on when a requeued RT task times out" pick fcc893280f4e Revert "rtmutex: Handle the various new futex race conditions" pick 2eac93cf9d16 Revert "futex: workaround migrate_disable/enable in different context" pick 9b8964629f4f futex: Make the futex_hash_bucket lock raw pick cc1812bf198b futex: Delay deallocation of pi_state
pick f5e115c43100 mm/zswap: Do not disable preemption in zswap_frontswap_store() pick e0d0d09a08ad revert-aio pick a0a40bfb4300 fs/aio: simple simple work pick 0fae581d8c5e revert-thermal pick c0d95b4a8a1b thermal: Defer thermal wakups to threads pick 700fbb4afb6e revert-block pick 4cda50ff12cf block: blk-mq: move blk_queue_usage_counter_release() into process context pick 9e982f55745b workqueue: rework pick c0db53dc3bf4 i2c: exynos5: Remove IRQF_ONESHOT pick 1f160d170203 i2c: hix5hd2: Remove IRQF_ONESHOT BAD 122882826 eae5a7cab722 sched/deadline: Ensure inactive_timer runs in hardirq context
And something went seriously wrong after these tests. I submitted same tree twice, and got different results.
First this -- de0-nano succeeds:
https://gitlab.com/cip-project/cip-kernel/linux-cip/pipelines/122904930
Now this -- de0-nano fails (and ipc227e is unfinished for long time):
https://gitlab.com/cip-project/cip-kernel/linux-cip/pipelines/122959477
I'll need some help here. The logs read like the targets are not (always) coming up, e.g. https://gitlab.com/cip-project/cip-kernel/linux-cip/-/jobs/457824214#L377 Yes... I don't need that target, but I need de0-nano... and it did not work last time I checked. Bikram, could someone on your side check the board status in the Mentor lab? Thanks! On a related note... it would be good to somehow show difference between "kernel test failure" and "target failure". If we see bootloader in the logs, and then test fails/timeouts => "kernel test failure", I need to solve it. If we don't get messages from the bootloader => "target failure", someone needs to check the power relays or something... I'm not happy about the parsability of those LAVA logs either, but I have no idea if/how that can be improved best. Maybe Quirin has some idea based on his work with them. Jan -- Siemens AG, Corporate Technology, CT RDA IOT SES-DE Corporate Competence Center Embedded Linux
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Re: Package Proposal #1 (Security packages), rev03
Hi, As mentioned earlier, I had some questions / queries regarding the requirements for the proposed packages. Sending them here for discussion. Kento Yoshida <kento.yoshida.wz@...> writes: Requirements_for_proposal_SecurityWG_rev03.xlsx: the same file which I've already sent before to explain the requirement in the standard * sudo-ldap Is there a specific requirement to include sudo-ldap in favour of plain sudo? IIUC, sudo is a minimal dependency version while ldap requires additional packages to be available. * openssh Based on the listed requierments, it is not clear why ftp and ssh clients are needed. Can you please clarify the requirements' text to motivate inclusion of the client binaries as well. * pam-pkcs11 From my understanding, the package enables login using public / private keys. But the requirements talk about enforcing the strength of passwords - "A minimum strength of used passwords needs to be enforced." Possibly a mixup of package and requirements? * tpm2* I think libtss2-esys0 is mistakenly included as explicit requirement. It seems to be a dependency of tpm2-abrmd and will get pulled in automatically as per my understanding. * uuid-runtime It’s not clear how the package is related to the requirement - "Account Identifier shall be unique on a component or system wide level. Protection of relevant information in rest and transit shall be supported." Can you add more details to the requirement to clarify this? --- Thanks, Punit
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I need de0-nano testing for -rt release was Re: 4.19.106-cip21-rt8 problems on de0-nano
Hi! I pushed candidate for -cip-rt, but it seems to fail on de0-nano board. Code under testing is at:
https://gitlab.com/cip-project/cip-kernel/linux-cip/tree/ci/pavel/linux-cip It is pipeline
https://gitlab.com/cip-project/cip-kernel/linux-cip/pipelines/122762401
I'll reuse the branch for more testing. I managed to narrow the bad commit to the -rt tree, between:
OK 122904930 pick 69aa73357e6a rcu: Don't allow to change rcu_normal_after_boot on RT pick 849ef8789077 pci/switchtec: fix stream_open.cocci warnings pick ad8a5e8279c4 sched/core: Drop a preempt_disable_rt() statement pick 966f066d96cb timers: Redo the notification of canceling timers on -RT pick 0393fd5a4f9a Revert "futex: Ensure lock/unlock symetry versus pi_lock and hash bucket lock" pick 84eb0b64a27a Revert "futex: Fix bug on when a requeued RT task times out" pick fcc893280f4e Revert "rtmutex: Handle the various new futex race conditions" pick 2eac93cf9d16 Revert "futex: workaround migrate_disable/enable in different context" pick 9b8964629f4f futex: Make the futex_hash_bucket lock raw pick cc1812bf198b futex: Delay deallocation of pi_state
pick f5e115c43100 mm/zswap: Do not disable preemption in zswap_frontswap_store() pick e0d0d09a08ad revert-aio pick a0a40bfb4300 fs/aio: simple simple work pick 0fae581d8c5e revert-thermal pick c0d95b4a8a1b thermal: Defer thermal wakups to threads pick 700fbb4afb6e revert-block pick 4cda50ff12cf block: blk-mq: move blk_queue_usage_counter_release() into process context pick 9e982f55745b workqueue: rework pick c0db53dc3bf4 i2c: exynos5: Remove IRQF_ONESHOT pick 1f160d170203 i2c: hix5hd2: Remove IRQF_ONESHOT BAD 122882826 eae5a7cab722 sched/deadline: Ensure inactive_timer runs in hardirq context
And something went seriously wrong after these tests. I submitted same tree twice, and got different results.
First this -- de0-nano succeeds:
https://gitlab.com/cip-project/cip-kernel/linux-cip/pipelines/122904930
Now this -- de0-nano fails (and ipc227e is unfinished for long time):
https://gitlab.com/cip-project/cip-kernel/linux-cip/pipelines/122959477
I'll need some help here. The logs read like the targets are not (always) coming up, e.g. https://gitlab.com/cip-project/cip-kernel/linux-cip/-/jobs/457824214#L377
Yes... I don't need that target, but I need de0-nano... and it did not work last time I checked. On a related note... it would be good to somehow show difference between "kernel test failure" and "target failure". If we see bootloader in the logs, and then test fails/timeouts => "kernel test failure", I need to solve it. If we don't get messages from the bootloader => "target failure", someone needs to check the power relays or something... Best regards, Pavel -- DENX Software Engineering GmbH, Managing Director: Wolfgang Denk HRB 165235 Munich, Office: Kirchenstr.5, D-82194 Groebenzell, Germany
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Linux-cip: Kselftest plans
Hi All, Is kselftest maintained in the cip-kernel tree? I do see some branch[1] maintained by Nobuhiro-san for kselftest, but it's out of 5.6 linux tree. The reason being to gather collective thoughts about the plan for kselftest based tests for cip kernel. Are there any existing or future plans for using kselftest for testing cip kernels? If so are we going to use the latest tree from upstream or plan to fix/backport test cases to current cip kernel versions? [1] https://gitlab.com/cip-project/cip-kernel/linux-cip/-/tree/ci/iwamatsu/linux-cip-kselftestThanks, Vijai Kumar K
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Re: Sample image including security packages
Hi Kazu-san and Dinesh,
I have created the image with all proposed security packages included. applied the below change, and booted the image in QEMU correctly. ----------------- diff --git a/recipes-core/images/cip-core-image-security.bb b/recipes-core/images/cip-core-image-security.bb index 70571f8..b883414 100644 --- a/recipes-core/images/cip-core-image-security.bb +++ b/recipes-core/images/cip-core-image-security.bb @@ -18,7 +18,7 @@ IMAGE_INSTALL += "customizations" # Debian packages that provide security features # TODO: Add sudo or sudo-ldap which conflict each other -IMAGE_PREINSTALL = " \ +IMAGE_PREINSTALL += " \ openssl libssl1.1 \ fail2ban \ openssh-server openssh-sftp-server openssh-client \ -- -----------------
Thanks venkata
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-----Original Message----- From: Venkata Seshagiri Pyla Sent: 02 March 2020 19:38 To: Dinesh Kumar <Dinesh.Kumar@...>; kazuhiro3.hayashi@... Cc: cip-security@...; cip-dev@... Subject: RE: Sample image including security packages Hi Kazu-san and Dinesh, We found most of the packages are not included in the isar image, could you please confirm whether all the proposed packages are included in the given source? If it is included, could you please let us know how to install them in the image? I think we have to create the image for the target "cip-core-image-security" instead of "cip-core-image". All the security packages are configured to install are present in this file "cip-core-image-security.bb". I will generate the image for target "cip-core-image-security" and recheck all the security functionality. Thanks, Venkata. -----Original Message----- From: Cip-security [mailto:cip-security-bounces@...] On Behalf Of Dinesh Kumar Sent: 02 March 2020 15:29 To: kazuhiro3.hayashi@... Cc: cip-security@...; cip-dev@... Subject: Re: [Cip-security] Sample image including security packages Dear Kazu-san, Thanks for sharing the isar-cip-core repository details with us. We followed below steps to first confirm whether all the proposed binaries are included when we create CIP isar based image. 1. Create CIP isar based image from " https://gitlab.com/zuka0828/isar-cip-core/-/tree/master" for QEMU_x86-64 platform 2. Booted the image in QEMU virtual machine 3. For each security package we compared the binaries listed on Debian page e.g. for acl package at ( https://packages.debian.org/buster/amd64/acl/filelist) According to the Debian page there are three binaries which should be present in the image "/bin/chacl", "/bin/getfacl", "/bin/setfacl". Then we check in the CIP running image at /bin whether all three packages are included or not. 4. Based on this kind of investigation we have prepare the attached list of missing binary packages in current CIP isar image. We found most of the packages are not included in the isar image, could you please confirm whether all the proposed packages are included in the given source? If it is included, could you please let us know how to install them in the image? Once all the security packages are included in the CIP isar image, we will proceed to next step of verifying applicable IEC 62443-4-2 security requirements. Thanks & Regards, Dinesh Kumar -----Original Message----- From: Cip-security <cip-security-bounces@...> On Behalf Of kazuhiro3.hayashi@... Sent: 21 February 2020 10:58 To: cip-security@... Cc: cip-dev@... Subject: [Cip-security] Sample image including security packages Hello CIP Security WG, I've created a sample setting to customize CIP Core generic profile. https://gitlab.com/zuka0828/isar-cip-core/-/tree/master(Now in my personal account) Introduction: https://gitlab.com/zuka0828/isar-cip-core/-/blob/master/SECURITY.mdPlease ask in cip-dev if you need more development information :) Note: `sudo` and `sudo-ldap` conflict each other, but both were proposed. We need to select one from them. I temporally removed the both from `IMAGE_PREINSTALL`. Best regards, Kazu _______________________________________________ Cip-security mailing list Cip-security@... https://lists.cip-project.org/mailman/listinfo/cip-securityThe information contained in this e-mail message and in any attachments/annexure/appendices is confidential to the recipient and may contain privileged information. If you are not the intended recipient, please notify the sender and delete the message along with any attachments/annexure/appendices. You should not disclose, copy or otherwise use the information contained in the message or any annexure. Any views expressed in this e-mail are those of the individual sender except where the sender specifically states them to be the views of Toshiba Software India Pvt. Ltd. (TSIP),Bangalore. Although this transmission and any attachments are believed to be free of any virus or other defect that might affect any computer system into which it is received and opened, it is the responsibility of the recipient to ensure that it is virus free and no responsibility is accepted by Toshiba Embedded Software India Pvt. Ltd, for any loss or damage arising in any way from its use. The information contained in this e-mail message and in any attachments/annexure/appendices is confidential to the recipient and may contain privileged information. If you are not the intended recipient, please notify the sender and delete the message along with any attachments/annexure/appendices. You should not disclose, copy or otherwise use the information contained in the message or any annexure. Any views expressed in this e-mail are those of the individual sender except where the sender specifically states them to be the views of Toshiba Software India Pvt. Ltd. (TSIP),Bangalore. Although this transmission and any attachments are believed to be free of any virus or other defect that might affect any computer system into which it is received and opened, it is the responsibility of the recipient to ensure that it is virus free and no responsibility is accepted by Toshiba Embedded Software India Pvt. Ltd, for any loss or damage arising in any way from its use.
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CIP IRC weekly meeting today
Hi all, Kindly be reminded to attend the weekly meeting through IRC to discuss technical topics with CIP kernel today. *Please note that the IRC meeting was rescheduled to UTC (GMT) 09:00 starting from the first week of Apr. according to TSC meeting* https://www.timeanddate.com/worldclock/meetingdetails.html?year=2019&month=11&day=28&hour=9&min=0&sec=0&p1=241&p2=137&p3=179&p4=136&p5=37&p6=248US-West US-East UK DE TW JP 01:00 04:00 09:00 10:00 17:00 18:00 Channel: * irc:chat.freenode.net:6667/cip Last meeting minutes: https://irclogs.baserock.org/meetings/cip/2020/02/cip.2020-02-20-09.00.log.htmlAgenda: * Action item 1. Combine root filesystem with kselftest binary - Iwamatsu-san Additional action items were identified at the team call last week. I am preparing to list them here. Please wait for a moment to appear them. * Kernel maintenance updates * Kernel testing * CIP Core * Software update * AOB 1. Migratoin from Mailman2 to Groupio Any opinion about the migration timing from Mailman2 to Groups.io? Excerpt from a mail of Linux Foundation: +++ We are now ready to migrate from Mailman2 to Groups.io . cip-dev archives are already being hosted at lore.kernel.org, and when we perform the migration they will continue to be hosted on that site, there is nothing more we need to do. Linux Foundation IT needs about 3 weeks or more notice to coordinate the migration. There will be as much as 24 hours downtime for all the CIP lists, however, emails will be queued up and not lost, during that time. When Groups.io comes back up, the emails will come through. +++ The meeting will take 30 min, although it can be extended to an hour if it makes sense and those involved in the topics can stay. Otherwise, the topic will be taken offline or in the next meeting. Best regards, -- M. Kudo Cybertrust Japan Co., Ltd.
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Re: CIP kernel meeting on IRC on Thursday
Hi, Pavel-san,
Thanks for your updates. If you cannot make it, see you next week on the IRC.
Best regards, -- M. Kudo
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-----Original Message----- From: Pavel Machek <pavel@...> Sent: Thursday, March 5, 2020 8:01 AM To: 工藤 雅司(CTJ) <masashi.kudo@...>; cip-dev@... Subject: CIP kernel meeting on IRC on Thursday Hi! I'm not sure if I'll be able to make it on IRC this Thursday. Work done this week: reviews on 4.19.107 and 4.19.108. Attempt to create new 4.19-rt release, but it has failures on arm_siemens_de0, I'm still debugging that. Best regards, Pavel -- (english) http://www.livejournal.com/~pavelmachek(cesky, pictures) http://atrey.karlin.mff.cuni.cz/~pavel/picture/horses/blog.html
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CIP kernel meeting on IRC on Thursday
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Re: 4.19.106-cip21-rt8 problems on de0-nano
On 03.03.20 22:28, Pavel Machek wrote: Hi!
I pushed candidate for -cip-rt, but it seems to fail on de0-nano board. Code under testing is at:
https://gitlab.com/cip-project/cip-kernel/linux-cip/tree/ci/pavel/linux-cip It is pipeline
https://gitlab.com/cip-project/cip-kernel/linux-cip/pipelines/122762401
I'll reuse the branch for more testing. I managed to narrow the bad commit to the -rt tree, between:
OK 122904930 pick 69aa73357e6a rcu: Don't allow to change rcu_normal_after_boot on RT pick 849ef8789077 pci/switchtec: fix stream_open.cocci warnings pick ad8a5e8279c4 sched/core: Drop a preempt_disable_rt() statement pick 966f066d96cb timers: Redo the notification of canceling timers on -RT pick 0393fd5a4f9a Revert "futex: Ensure lock/unlock symetry versus pi_lock and hash bucket lock" pick 84eb0b64a27a Revert "futex: Fix bug on when a requeued RT task times out" pick fcc893280f4e Revert "rtmutex: Handle the various new futex race conditions" pick 2eac93cf9d16 Revert "futex: workaround migrate_disable/enable in different context" pick 9b8964629f4f futex: Make the futex_hash_bucket lock raw pick cc1812bf198b futex: Delay deallocation of pi_state
pick f5e115c43100 mm/zswap: Do not disable preemption in zswap_frontswap_store() pick e0d0d09a08ad revert-aio pick a0a40bfb4300 fs/aio: simple simple work pick 0fae581d8c5e revert-thermal pick c0d95b4a8a1b thermal: Defer thermal wakups to threads pick 700fbb4afb6e revert-block pick 4cda50ff12cf block: blk-mq: move blk_queue_usage_counter_release() into process context pick 9e982f55745b workqueue: rework pick c0db53dc3bf4 i2c: exynos5: Remove IRQF_ONESHOT pick 1f160d170203 i2c: hix5hd2: Remove IRQF_ONESHOT BAD 122882826 eae5a7cab722 sched/deadline: Ensure inactive_timer runs in hardirq context
And something went seriously wrong after these tests. I submitted same tree twice, and got different results. First this -- de0-nano succeeds: https://gitlab.com/cip-project/cip-kernel/linux-cip/pipelines/122904930 Now this -- de0-nano fails (and ipc227e is unfinished for long time): https://gitlab.com/cip-project/cip-kernel/linux-cip/pipelines/122959477 I'll need some help here.
The logs read like the targets are not (always) coming up, e.g. https://gitlab.com/cip-project/cip-kernel/linux-cip/-/jobs/457824214#L377Jan -- Siemens AG, Corporate Technology, CT RDA IOT SES-DE Corporate Competence Center Embedded Linux
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Re: 4.19.106-cip21-rt8 problems on de0-nano
Hi! I pushed candidate for -cip-rt, but it seems to fail on de0-nano board. Code under testing is at:
https://gitlab.com/cip-project/cip-kernel/linux-cip/tree/ci/pavel/linux-cip It is pipeline
https://gitlab.com/cip-project/cip-kernel/linux-cip/pipelines/122762401
I'll reuse the branch for more testing. I managed to narrow the bad commit to the -rt tree, between:
OK 122904930 pick 69aa73357e6a rcu: Don't allow to change rcu_normal_after_boot on RT pick 849ef8789077 pci/switchtec: fix stream_open.cocci warnings pick ad8a5e8279c4 sched/core: Drop a preempt_disable_rt() statement pick 966f066d96cb timers: Redo the notification of canceling timers on -RT pick 0393fd5a4f9a Revert "futex: Ensure lock/unlock symetry versus pi_lock and hash bucket lock" pick 84eb0b64a27a Revert "futex: Fix bug on when a requeued RT task times out" pick fcc893280f4e Revert "rtmutex: Handle the various new futex race conditions" pick 2eac93cf9d16 Revert "futex: workaround migrate_disable/enable in different context" pick 9b8964629f4f futex: Make the futex_hash_bucket lock raw pick cc1812bf198b futex: Delay deallocation of pi_state
pick f5e115c43100 mm/zswap: Do not disable preemption in zswap_frontswap_store() pick e0d0d09a08ad revert-aio pick a0a40bfb4300 fs/aio: simple simple work pick 0fae581d8c5e revert-thermal pick c0d95b4a8a1b thermal: Defer thermal wakups to threads pick 700fbb4afb6e revert-block pick 4cda50ff12cf block: blk-mq: move blk_queue_usage_counter_release() into process context pick 9e982f55745b workqueue: rework pick c0db53dc3bf4 i2c: exynos5: Remove IRQF_ONESHOT pick 1f160d170203 i2c: hix5hd2: Remove IRQF_ONESHOT BAD 122882826 eae5a7cab722 sched/deadline: Ensure inactive_timer runs in hardirq context
And something went seriously wrong after these tests. I submitted same tree twice, and got different results. First this -- de0-nano succeeds: https://gitlab.com/cip-project/cip-kernel/linux-cip/pipelines/122904930Now this -- de0-nano fails (and ipc227e is unfinished for long time): https://gitlab.com/cip-project/cip-kernel/linux-cip/pipelines/122959477I'll need some help here. Best regards, Pavel -- DENX Software Engineering GmbH, Managing Director: Wolfgang Denk HRB 165235 Munich, Office: Kirchenstr.5, D-82194 Groebenzell, Germany
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Re: 4.19.106-cip21-rt8 problems on de0-nano
Hi! I pushed candidate for -cip-rt, but it seems to fail on de0-nano board. Code under testing is at:
https://gitlab.com/cip-project/cip-kernel/linux-cip/tree/ci/pavel/linux-cip It is pipeline
https://gitlab.com/cip-project/cip-kernel/linux-cip/pipelines/122762401
I'll reuse the branch for more testing.
I managed to narrow the bad commit to the -rt tree, between: OK 122904930 pick 69aa73357e6a rcu: Don't allow to change rcu_normal_after_boot on RT pick 849ef8789077 pci/switchtec: fix stream_open.cocci warnings pick ad8a5e8279c4 sched/core: Drop a preempt_disable_rt() statement pick 966f066d96cb timers: Redo the notification of canceling timers on -RT pick 0393fd5a4f9a Revert "futex: Ensure lock/unlock symetry versus pi_lock and hash bucket lock" pick 84eb0b64a27a Revert "futex: Fix bug on when a requeued RT task times out" pick fcc893280f4e Revert "rtmutex: Handle the various new futex race conditions" pick 2eac93cf9d16 Revert "futex: workaround migrate_disable/enable in different context" pick 9b8964629f4f futex: Make the futex_hash_bucket lock raw pick cc1812bf198b futex: Delay deallocation of pi_state pick f5e115c43100 mm/zswap: Do not disable preemption in zswap_frontswap_store() pick e0d0d09a08ad revert-aio pick a0a40bfb4300 fs/aio: simple simple work pick 0fae581d8c5e revert-thermal pick c0d95b4a8a1b thermal: Defer thermal wakups to threads pick 700fbb4afb6e revert-block pick 4cda50ff12cf block: blk-mq: move blk_queue_usage_counter_release() into process context pick 9e982f55745b workqueue: rework pick c0db53dc3bf4 i2c: exynos5: Remove IRQF_ONESHOT pick 1f160d170203 i2c: hix5hd2: Remove IRQF_ONESHOT BAD 122882826 eae5a7cab722 sched/deadline: Ensure inactive_timer runs in hardirq context Best regards, Pavel -- DENX Software Engineering GmbH, Managing Director: Wolfgang Denk HRB 165235 Munich, Office: Kirchenstr.5, D-82194 Groebenzell, Germany
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