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Re: Update week 47
Hi,
(Cc'ed to Fuego and LTSI mailing lists).
Hi,
(Cc'ed to Fuego and LTSI mailing lists).
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By
Daniel Sangorrin <daniel.sangorrin@...>
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#81
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Re: [Fuego] Update week 47
By
Bird, Timothy <Tim.Bird@...>
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#84
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Re: Features backports
Hi,
I think we have a good chance once they see we are testing Beaglebone Black in the open. That would be a good opportunity we might add value to them.
Definitely I would talk to them before. If
Hi,
I think we have a good chance once they see we are testing Beaglebone Black in the open. That would be a good opportunity we might add value to them.
Definitely I would talk to them before. If
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By
Agustin Benito Bethencourt <agustin.benito@...>
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#82
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Open Source OPC UA
Hi all,
does anyone already have some experience with OSS OPC UA
implementations, specifically for resource constrained devices? We
stumbled over
http://open62541.org
which seems like being on the
Hi all,
does anyone already have some experience with OSS OPC UA
implementations, specifically for resource constrained devices? We
stumbled over
http://open62541.org
which seems like being on the
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By
Jan Kiszka
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#83
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Re: Open Source OPC UA
Am 29/11/2016 um 20:36 schrieb Jan Kiszka:
there's another tiny implementation from some of the Ostwestfalen-Lippe
(OWL) group of people in Germany, but since it targets devices with
only 10s of KiB
Am 29/11/2016 um 20:36 schrieb Jan Kiszka:
there's another tiny implementation from some of the Ostwestfalen-Lippe
(OWL) group of people in Germany, but since it targets devices with
only 10s of KiB
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By
Wolfgang Mauerer <wm@...>
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#85
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Re: Open Source OPC UA
If you have a link (and the project has a proper license), maybe send a
PR to the open62541.org to extend their list.
If we only had higher languages, that would be a major limitation. It's
not so
If you have a link (and the project has a proper license), maybe send a
PR to the open62541.org to extend their list.
If we only had higher languages, that would be a major limitation. It's
not so
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By
Jan Kiszka
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#86
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Re: Features backports
Hi,
Since the Intel Apollo Lake has already released, we started to check the
patches for that. I think the basic functionality has already upstreamed
and it might be enough for expected use
Hi,
Since the Intel Apollo Lake has already released, we started to check the
patches for that. I think the basic functionality has already upstreamed
and it might be enough for expected use
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By
Yoshitake Kobayashi
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#87
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The Problem with build.log
Hi Robert,
I may have found the problem with the links to the build.log,
kernel.config and zImage files.
As you can see from the attached Screenshots, when I hover over the
links, the URL has some
Hi Robert,
I may have found the problem with the links to the build.log,
kernel.config and zImage files.
As you can see from the attached Screenshots, when I hover over the
links, the URL has some
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By
Don Brown <don.brown@...>
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#125
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[PATCH 4.4-cip 0/6] Extend user-space ASLR range
This is a backport of changes in 4.5 to extend the range of Address
Space Layout Randomisation for user-space processes. When enabled, this
should make some user-space vulnerabilities harder to
This is a backport of changes in 4.5 to extend the range of Address
Space Layout Randomisation for user-space processes. When enabled, this
should make some user-space vulnerabilities harder to
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By
Ben Hutchings <ben.hutchings@...>
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#88
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[PATCH 4.4-cip 1/6] mm: mmap: add new /proc tunable for mmap_base ASLR
From: Daniel Cashman <dcashman@...>
commit d07e22597d1d355829b7b18ac19afa912cf758d1 upstream.
Address Space Layout Randomization (ASLR) provides a barrier to
exploitation of user-space
From: Daniel Cashman <dcashman@...>
commit d07e22597d1d355829b7b18ac19afa912cf758d1 upstream.
Address Space Layout Randomization (ASLR) provides a barrier to
exploitation of user-space
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By
Ben Hutchings <ben.hutchings@...>
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#89
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[PATCH 4.4-cip 2/6] arm: mm: support ARCH_MMAP_RND_BITS
From: Daniel Cashman <dcashman@...>
commit e0c25d958f78acfd5c97df5776eeba3e0684101b upstream.
arm: arch_mmap_rnd() uses a hard-code value of 8 to generate the random
offset for the mmap base
From: Daniel Cashman <dcashman@...>
commit e0c25d958f78acfd5c97df5776eeba3e0684101b upstream.
arm: arch_mmap_rnd() uses a hard-code value of 8 to generate the random
offset for the mmap base
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By
Ben Hutchings <ben.hutchings@...>
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#90
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[PATCH 4.4-cip 3/6] arm64: mm: support ARCH_MMAP_RND_BITS
From: Daniel Cashman <dcashman@...>
commit 8f0d3aa9de57662fe35d8bacfbd9d7ef85ffe98f upstream.
arm64: arch_mmap_rnd() uses STACK_RND_MASK to generate the random offset
for the mmap base
From: Daniel Cashman <dcashman@...>
commit 8f0d3aa9de57662fe35d8bacfbd9d7ef85ffe98f upstream.
arm64: arch_mmap_rnd() uses STACK_RND_MASK to generate the random offset
for the mmap base
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By
Ben Hutchings <ben.hutchings@...>
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#91
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[PATCH 4.4-cip 4/6] x86: mm: support ARCH_MMAP_RND_BITS
From: Daniel Cashman <dcashman@...>
commit 9e08f57d684ac2f40685f55f659564bfd91a971e upstream.
x86: arch_mmap_rnd() uses hard-coded values, 8 for 32-bit and 28 for
64-bit, to generate the
From: Daniel Cashman <dcashman@...>
commit 9e08f57d684ac2f40685f55f659564bfd91a971e upstream.
x86: arch_mmap_rnd() uses hard-coded values, 8 for 32-bit and 28 for
64-bit, to generate the
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By
Ben Hutchings <ben.hutchings@...>
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#92
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[PATCH 4.4-cip 5/6] drivers: char: random: add get_random_long()
Daniel Cashman <dcashman@...>
commit ec9ee4acd97c0039a61c0ae4f12705767ae62153 upstream.
Commit d07e22597d1d ("mm: mmap: add new /proc tunable for mmap_base
ASLR") added the ability to choose
Daniel Cashman <dcashman@...>
commit ec9ee4acd97c0039a61c0ae4f12705767ae62153 upstream.
Commit d07e22597d1d ("mm: mmap: add new /proc tunable for mmap_base
ASLR") added the ability to choose
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By
Ben Hutchings <ben.hutchings@...>
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#93
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[PATCH 4.4-cip 6/6] mm: ASLR: use get_random_long()
From: Daniel Cashman <dcashman@...>
commit 5ef11c35ce86b94bfb878b684de4cdaf96f54b2f upstream.
Replace calls to get_random_int() followed by a cast to (unsigned long)
with calls to
From: Daniel Cashman <dcashman@...>
commit 5ef11c35ce86b94bfb878b684de4cdaf96f54b2f upstream.
Replace calls to get_random_int() followed by a cast to (unsigned long)
with calls to
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By
Ben Hutchings <ben.hutchings@...>
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#94
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[PATCH 4.4-cip 0/5] Faster page poisoning for security
This is a backport of changes in 4.6 to add new config options to page
poisoning. Page poisoning was originally intended a debug feature for
finding use-after-free bugs in the kernel, but it can also
This is a backport of changes in 4.6 to add new config options to page
poisoning. Page poisoning was originally intended a debug feature for
finding use-after-free bugs in the kernel, but it can also
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By
Ben Hutchings <ben.hutchings@...>
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#95
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[PATCH 4.4-cip 1/5] mm/slab: activate debug_pagealloc in SLAB when it is actually enabled
From: Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@...>
commit a307ebd468e0b97c203f5a99a56a6017e4d1991a upstream.
Signed-off-by: Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@...>
Acked-by: Christoph Lameter
From: Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@...>
commit a307ebd468e0b97c203f5a99a56a6017e4d1991a upstream.
Signed-off-by: Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@...>
Acked-by: Christoph Lameter
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By
Ben Hutchings <ben.hutchings@...>
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#96
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[PATCH 4.4-cip 2/5] mm/slab: use more appropriate condition check for debug_pagealloc
From: Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@...>
commit 40323278b557a5909bbecfa181c91a3af7afbbe3 upstream.
debug_pagealloc debugging is related to SLAB_POISON flag rather than
FORCED_DEBUG option,
From: Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@...>
commit 40323278b557a5909bbecfa181c91a3af7afbbe3 upstream.
debug_pagealloc debugging is related to SLAB_POISON flag rather than
FORCED_DEBUG option,
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By
Ben Hutchings <ben.hutchings@...>
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#97
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[PATCH 4.4-cip 3/5] mm/slab: clean up DEBUG_PAGEALLOC processing code
From: Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@...>
commit 40b44137971c2e5865a78f9f7de274449983ccb5 upstream.
Currently, open code for checking DEBUG_PAGEALLOC cache is spread to
some sites. It makes code
From: Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@...>
commit 40b44137971c2e5865a78f9f7de274449983ccb5 upstream.
Currently, open code for checking DEBUG_PAGEALLOC cache is spread to
some sites. It makes code
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By
Ben Hutchings <ben.hutchings@...>
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#98
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[PATCH 4.4-cip 4/5] mm/page_poison.c: enable PAGE_POISONING as a separate option
From: Laura Abbott <labbott@...>
commit 8823b1dbc05fab1a8bec275eeae4709257c2661d upstream.
Page poisoning is currently set up as a feature if architectures don't
have architecture
From: Laura Abbott <labbott@...>
commit 8823b1dbc05fab1a8bec275eeae4709257c2661d upstream.
Page poisoning is currently set up as a feature if architectures don't
have architecture
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By
Ben Hutchings <ben.hutchings@...>
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#99
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