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Re: Update week 47
Hi,
(Cc'ed to Fuego and LTSI mailing lists).
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Hi,
(Cc'ed to Fuego and LTSI mailing lists).
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By
Daniel Sangorrin <daniel.sangorrin@...>
·
#81
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Re: [Fuego] Update week 47
By
Bird, Timothy <Tim.Bird@...>
·
#84
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Re: Features backports
Hi,
I think we have a good chance once they see we are testing Beaglebone Black in the open. That would be a good opportunity we might add value to them.
Definitely I would talk to them before. If
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Hi,
I think we have a good chance once they see we are testing Beaglebone Black in the open. That would be a good opportunity we might add value to them.
Definitely I would talk to them before. If
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By
Agustin Benito Bethencourt <agustin.benito@...>
·
#82
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Open Source OPC UA
Hi all,
does anyone already have some experience with OSS OPC UA
implementations, specifically for resource constrained devices? We
stumbled over
http://open62541.org
which seems like being on the
|
Hi all,
does anyone already have some experience with OSS OPC UA
implementations, specifically for resource constrained devices? We
stumbled over
http://open62541.org
which seems like being on the
|
By
Jan Kiszka
·
#83
·
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Re: Open Source OPC UA
Am 29/11/2016 um 20:36 schrieb Jan Kiszka:
there's another tiny implementation from some of the Ostwestfalen-Lippe
(OWL) group of people in Germany, but since it targets devices with
only 10s of KiB
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Am 29/11/2016 um 20:36 schrieb Jan Kiszka:
there's another tiny implementation from some of the Ostwestfalen-Lippe
(OWL) group of people in Germany, but since it targets devices with
only 10s of KiB
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By
Wolfgang Mauerer <wm@...>
·
#85
·
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Re: Open Source OPC UA
If you have a link (and the project has a proper license), maybe send a
PR to the open62541.org to extend their list.
If we only had higher languages, that would be a major limitation. It's
not so
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If you have a link (and the project has a proper license), maybe send a
PR to the open62541.org to extend their list.
If we only had higher languages, that would be a major limitation. It's
not so
|
By
Jan Kiszka
·
#86
·
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Re: Features backports
Hi,
Since the Intel Apollo Lake has already released, we started to check the
patches for that. I think the basic functionality has already upstreamed
and it might be enough for expected use
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Hi,
Since the Intel Apollo Lake has already released, we started to check the
patches for that. I think the basic functionality has already upstreamed
and it might be enough for expected use
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By
Yoshitake Kobayashi
·
#87
·
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The Problem with build.log
Hi Robert,
I may have found the problem with the links to the build.log,
kernel.config and zImage files.
As you can see from the attached Screenshots, when I hover over the
links, the URL has some
|
Hi Robert,
I may have found the problem with the links to the build.log,
kernel.config and zImage files.
As you can see from the attached Screenshots, when I hover over the
links, the URL has some
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By
Don Brown <don.brown@...>
·
#125
·
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[PATCH 4.4-cip 0/6] Extend user-space ASLR range
This is a backport of changes in 4.5 to extend the range of Address
Space Layout Randomisation for user-space processes. When enabled, this
should make some user-space vulnerabilities harder to
|
This is a backport of changes in 4.5 to extend the range of Address
Space Layout Randomisation for user-space processes. When enabled, this
should make some user-space vulnerabilities harder to
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By
Ben Hutchings <ben.hutchings@...>
·
#88
·
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[PATCH 4.4-cip 1/6] mm: mmap: add new /proc tunable for mmap_base ASLR
From: Daniel Cashman <dcashman@...>
commit d07e22597d1d355829b7b18ac19afa912cf758d1 upstream.
Address Space Layout Randomization (ASLR) provides a barrier to
exploitation of user-space
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From: Daniel Cashman <dcashman@...>
commit d07e22597d1d355829b7b18ac19afa912cf758d1 upstream.
Address Space Layout Randomization (ASLR) provides a barrier to
exploitation of user-space
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By
Ben Hutchings <ben.hutchings@...>
·
#89
·
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[PATCH 4.4-cip 2/6] arm: mm: support ARCH_MMAP_RND_BITS
From: Daniel Cashman <dcashman@...>
commit e0c25d958f78acfd5c97df5776eeba3e0684101b upstream.
arm: arch_mmap_rnd() uses a hard-code value of 8 to generate the random
offset for the mmap base
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From: Daniel Cashman <dcashman@...>
commit e0c25d958f78acfd5c97df5776eeba3e0684101b upstream.
arm: arch_mmap_rnd() uses a hard-code value of 8 to generate the random
offset for the mmap base
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By
Ben Hutchings <ben.hutchings@...>
·
#90
·
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[PATCH 4.4-cip 3/6] arm64: mm: support ARCH_MMAP_RND_BITS
From: Daniel Cashman <dcashman@...>
commit 8f0d3aa9de57662fe35d8bacfbd9d7ef85ffe98f upstream.
arm64: arch_mmap_rnd() uses STACK_RND_MASK to generate the random offset
for the mmap base
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From: Daniel Cashman <dcashman@...>
commit 8f0d3aa9de57662fe35d8bacfbd9d7ef85ffe98f upstream.
arm64: arch_mmap_rnd() uses STACK_RND_MASK to generate the random offset
for the mmap base
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By
Ben Hutchings <ben.hutchings@...>
·
#91
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[PATCH 4.4-cip 4/6] x86: mm: support ARCH_MMAP_RND_BITS
From: Daniel Cashman <dcashman@...>
commit 9e08f57d684ac2f40685f55f659564bfd91a971e upstream.
x86: arch_mmap_rnd() uses hard-coded values, 8 for 32-bit and 28 for
64-bit, to generate the
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From: Daniel Cashman <dcashman@...>
commit 9e08f57d684ac2f40685f55f659564bfd91a971e upstream.
x86: arch_mmap_rnd() uses hard-coded values, 8 for 32-bit and 28 for
64-bit, to generate the
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By
Ben Hutchings <ben.hutchings@...>
·
#92
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[PATCH 4.4-cip 5/6] drivers: char: random: add get_random_long()
Daniel Cashman <dcashman@...>
commit ec9ee4acd97c0039a61c0ae4f12705767ae62153 upstream.
Commit d07e22597d1d ("mm: mmap: add new /proc tunable for mmap_base
ASLR") added the ability to choose
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Daniel Cashman <dcashman@...>
commit ec9ee4acd97c0039a61c0ae4f12705767ae62153 upstream.
Commit d07e22597d1d ("mm: mmap: add new /proc tunable for mmap_base
ASLR") added the ability to choose
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By
Ben Hutchings <ben.hutchings@...>
·
#93
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[PATCH 4.4-cip 6/6] mm: ASLR: use get_random_long()
From: Daniel Cashman <dcashman@...>
commit 5ef11c35ce86b94bfb878b684de4cdaf96f54b2f upstream.
Replace calls to get_random_int() followed by a cast to (unsigned long)
with calls to
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From: Daniel Cashman <dcashman@...>
commit 5ef11c35ce86b94bfb878b684de4cdaf96f54b2f upstream.
Replace calls to get_random_int() followed by a cast to (unsigned long)
with calls to
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By
Ben Hutchings <ben.hutchings@...>
·
#94
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[PATCH 4.4-cip 0/5] Faster page poisoning for security
This is a backport of changes in 4.6 to add new config options to page
poisoning. Page poisoning was originally intended a debug feature for
finding use-after-free bugs in the kernel, but it can also
|
This is a backport of changes in 4.6 to add new config options to page
poisoning. Page poisoning was originally intended a debug feature for
finding use-after-free bugs in the kernel, but it can also
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By
Ben Hutchings <ben.hutchings@...>
·
#95
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[PATCH 4.4-cip 1/5] mm/slab: activate debug_pagealloc in SLAB when it is actually enabled
From: Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@...>
commit a307ebd468e0b97c203f5a99a56a6017e4d1991a upstream.
Signed-off-by: Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@...>
Acked-by: Christoph Lameter
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From: Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@...>
commit a307ebd468e0b97c203f5a99a56a6017e4d1991a upstream.
Signed-off-by: Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@...>
Acked-by: Christoph Lameter
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By
Ben Hutchings <ben.hutchings@...>
·
#96
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[PATCH 4.4-cip 2/5] mm/slab: use more appropriate condition check for debug_pagealloc
From: Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@...>
commit 40323278b557a5909bbecfa181c91a3af7afbbe3 upstream.
debug_pagealloc debugging is related to SLAB_POISON flag rather than
FORCED_DEBUG option,
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From: Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@...>
commit 40323278b557a5909bbecfa181c91a3af7afbbe3 upstream.
debug_pagealloc debugging is related to SLAB_POISON flag rather than
FORCED_DEBUG option,
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By
Ben Hutchings <ben.hutchings@...>
·
#97
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[PATCH 4.4-cip 3/5] mm/slab: clean up DEBUG_PAGEALLOC processing code
From: Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@...>
commit 40b44137971c2e5865a78f9f7de274449983ccb5 upstream.
Currently, open code for checking DEBUG_PAGEALLOC cache is spread to
some sites. It makes code
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From: Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@...>
commit 40b44137971c2e5865a78f9f7de274449983ccb5 upstream.
Currently, open code for checking DEBUG_PAGEALLOC cache is spread to
some sites. It makes code
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By
Ben Hutchings <ben.hutchings@...>
·
#98
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[PATCH 4.4-cip 4/5] mm/page_poison.c: enable PAGE_POISONING as a separate option
From: Laura Abbott <labbott@...>
commit 8823b1dbc05fab1a8bec275eeae4709257c2661d upstream.
Page poisoning is currently set up as a feature if architectures don't
have architecture
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From: Laura Abbott <labbott@...>
commit 8823b1dbc05fab1a8bec275eeae4709257c2661d upstream.
Page poisoning is currently set up as a feature if architectures don't
have architecture
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By
Ben Hutchings <ben.hutchings@...>
·
#99
·
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