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LWN article about stable workflow @kernel summit
Interesting to read: https://lwn.net/Articles/705220/ (subscriptions only until next week) In a nutshell: Folks are unhappy with the selection and review process of patches that go into stable kernels
Interesting to read: https://lwn.net/Articles/705220/ (subscriptions only until next week) In a nutshell: Folks are unhappy with the selection and review process of patches that go into stable kernels
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By
Jan Kiszka
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f2f meeting at ELCE 2016 summary
2 messages
Dear CIP friends, At ELCE Thursday Oct 13th, the CIP group had a f2f meeting. After having lunch together, Board members met for about an hour. After that the rest of the members joined and discussed
Dear CIP friends, At ELCE Thursday Oct 13th, the CIP group had a f2f meeting. After having lunch together, Board members met for about an hour. After that the rest of the members joined and discussed
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By
Agustin Benito Bethencourt
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Update week 44
3 messages
Hi, if you have any update not included in this mail, feel free to add it. I do not intend to provide a full weekly report but to inform about the activity I am aware of. ++ Meetings * Members meeting
Hi, if you have any update not included in this mail, feel free to add it. I do not intend to provide a full weekly report but to inform about the activity I am aware of. ++ Meetings * Members meeting
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By
Agustin Benito Bethencourt
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Super Long Term ... Support or Maintenance?
3 messages
Hi, I am writing a description for the wiki and this topic came to my mind. It is just a detail... I would like to propose that we say "maintenance" instead of "support" when referring to the activiti
Hi, I am writing a description for the wiki and this topic came to my mind. It is just a detail... I would like to propose that we say "maintenance" instead of "support" when referring to the activiti
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By
Agustin Benito Bethencourt
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Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures
Hi, one of the key parts of the maintenance work is to follow the Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVE)[1] and the fixes that comes out of them, in this case, to the kernel. We can check against
Hi, one of the key parts of the maintenance work is to follow the Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVE)[1] and the fixes that comes out of them, in this case, to the kernel. We can check against
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By
Agustin Benito Bethencourt
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Proposal: send gitlab notifications to this list
3 messages
Hi, I think it would be positive to activate the mail notifications from gitlab and send them to this list. By activating them, you will be able to follow what is happening in our repos through mail.
Hi, I think it would be positive to activate the mail notifications from gitlab and send them to this list. By activating them, you will be able to follow what is happening in our repos through mail.
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By
Agustin Benito Bethencourt
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Update week 47
2 messages
Hi, ++ Meetings * This week the team at Codethink working on CIP has met f2f for the first time in Manchester, since three of us work remotely from home. ** Agreed on basic management processes we wil
Hi, ++ Meetings * This week the team at Codethink working on CIP has met f2f for the first time in Manchester, since three of us work remotely from home. ** Agreed on basic management processes we wil
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By
Agustin Benito Bethencourt
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[Fuego] Update week 47
By
Bird, Timothy
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Open Source OPC UA
3 messages
Hi all, does anyone already have some experience with OSS OPC UA implementations, specifically for resource constrained devices? We stumbled over http://open62541.org which seems like being on the rig
Hi all, does anyone already have some experience with OSS OPC UA implementations, specifically for resource constrained devices? We stumbled over http://open62541.org which seems like being on the rig
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By
Jan Kiszka
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Features backports
6 messages
Hi, as you probably know, the more features we backport, the higher will be the maintenance cost overtime so as a strategy, we need to be very conservative. I sent a mail some days ago about the featu
Hi, as you probably know, the more features we backport, the higher will be the maintenance cost overtime so as a strategy, we need to be very conservative. I sent a mail some days ago about the featu
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By
Agustin Benito Bethencourt
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The Problem with build.log
Hi Robert, I may have found the problem with the links to the build.log, kernel.config and zImage files. As you can see from the attached Screenshots, when I hover over the links, the URL has some dup
Hi Robert, I may have found the problem with the links to the build.log, kernel.config and zImage files. As you can see from the attached Screenshots, when I hover over the links, the URL has some dup
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By
Don Brown
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[PATCH 4.4-cip 1/6] mm: mmap: add new /proc tunable for mmap_base ASLR
From: Daniel Cashman <dcashman@...> commit d07e22597d1d355829b7b18ac19afa912cf758d1 upstream. Address Space Layout Randomization (ASLR) provides a barrier to exploitation of user-space processes in th
From: Daniel Cashman <dcashman@...> commit d07e22597d1d355829b7b18ac19afa912cf758d1 upstream. Address Space Layout Randomization (ASLR) provides a barrier to exploitation of user-space processes in th
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By
Ben Hutchings
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[PATCH 4.4-cip 2/6] arm: mm: support ARCH_MMAP_RND_BITS
From: Daniel Cashman <dcashman@...> commit e0c25d958f78acfd5c97df5776eeba3e0684101b upstream. arm: arch_mmap_rnd() uses a hard-code value of 8 to generate the random offset for the mmap base address.
From: Daniel Cashman <dcashman@...> commit e0c25d958f78acfd5c97df5776eeba3e0684101b upstream. arm: arch_mmap_rnd() uses a hard-code value of 8 to generate the random offset for the mmap base address.
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By
Ben Hutchings
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[PATCH 4.4-cip 3/6] arm64: mm: support ARCH_MMAP_RND_BITS
From: Daniel Cashman <dcashman@...> commit 8f0d3aa9de57662fe35d8bacfbd9d7ef85ffe98f upstream. arm64: arch_mmap_rnd() uses STACK_RND_MASK to generate the random offset for the mmap base address. This v
From: Daniel Cashman <dcashman@...> commit 8f0d3aa9de57662fe35d8bacfbd9d7ef85ffe98f upstream. arm64: arch_mmap_rnd() uses STACK_RND_MASK to generate the random offset for the mmap base address. This v
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By
Ben Hutchings
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[PATCH 4.4-cip 4/6] x86: mm: support ARCH_MMAP_RND_BITS
From: Daniel Cashman <dcashman@...> commit 9e08f57d684ac2f40685f55f659564bfd91a971e upstream. x86: arch_mmap_rnd() uses hard-coded values, 8 for 32-bit and 28 for 64-bit, to generate the random offset
From: Daniel Cashman <dcashman@...> commit 9e08f57d684ac2f40685f55f659564bfd91a971e upstream. x86: arch_mmap_rnd() uses hard-coded values, 8 for 32-bit and 28 for 64-bit, to generate the random offset
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By
Ben Hutchings
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[PATCH 4.4-cip 5/6] drivers: char: random: add get_random_long()
Daniel Cashman <dcashman@...> commit ec9ee4acd97c0039a61c0ae4f12705767ae62153 upstream. Commit d07e22597d1d ("mm: mmap: add new /proc tunable for mmap_base ASLR") added the ability to choose from a ra
Daniel Cashman <dcashman@...> commit ec9ee4acd97c0039a61c0ae4f12705767ae62153 upstream. Commit d07e22597d1d ("mm: mmap: add new /proc tunable for mmap_base ASLR") added the ability to choose from a ra
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By
Ben Hutchings
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[PATCH 4.4-cip 6/6] mm: ASLR: use get_random_long()
From: Daniel Cashman <dcashman@...> commit 5ef11c35ce86b94bfb878b684de4cdaf96f54b2f upstream. Replace calls to get_random_int() followed by a cast to (unsigned long) with calls to get_random_long(). A
From: Daniel Cashman <dcashman@...> commit 5ef11c35ce86b94bfb878b684de4cdaf96f54b2f upstream. Replace calls to get_random_int() followed by a cast to (unsigned long) with calls to get_random_long(). A
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By
Ben Hutchings
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[PATCH 4.4-cip 0/5] Faster page poisoning for security
This is a backport of changes in 4.6 to add new config options to page poisoning. Page poisoning was originally intended a debug feature for finding use-after-free bugs in the kernel, but it can also
This is a backport of changes in 4.6 to add new config options to page poisoning. Page poisoning was originally intended a debug feature for finding use-after-free bugs in the kernel, but it can also
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By
Ben Hutchings
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[PATCH 4.4-cip 1/5] mm/slab: activate debug_pagealloc in SLAB when it is actually enabled
From: Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@...> commit a307ebd468e0b97c203f5a99a56a6017e4d1991a upstream. Signed-off-by: Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@...> Acked-by: Christoph Lameter <cl@...> Cc: David Rientjes
From: Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@...> commit a307ebd468e0b97c203f5a99a56a6017e4d1991a upstream. Signed-off-by: Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@...> Acked-by: Christoph Lameter <cl@...> Cc: David Rientjes
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By
Ben Hutchings
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[PATCH 4.4-cip 2/5] mm/slab: use more appropriate condition check for debug_pagealloc
From: Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@...> commit 40323278b557a5909bbecfa181c91a3af7afbbe3 upstream. debug_pagealloc debugging is related to SLAB_POISON flag rather than FORCED_DEBUG option, although FORC
From: Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@...> commit 40323278b557a5909bbecfa181c91a3af7afbbe3 upstream. debug_pagealloc debugging is related to SLAB_POISON flag rather than FORCED_DEBUG option, although FORC
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By
Ben Hutchings
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